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THE ORIGINS OF THE OBJECTIVE THEORY




By giving effect to the parties' intentions, the law of contracts is
based on respect for party autonomy. Nonetheless, the objective
theory of contract formation and interpretation holds that the
intentions of the parties to a contract or alleged contract are to be
ascertained from their words and conduct rather than their
unexpressed intentions. Three standard accounts of the origins of the
objective theory of contract formation and interpretation state that a
subjective theory was in effect in the early part of the nineteenth
century and was replaced by an objective theory in the second half of
that century in order to accommodate the needs of a national market
and the needs of the commercial classes. Lawrence Friedman's
account states that the theory was "developed by late nineteenth-
century and early twentieth-century scholars."' This, says Friedman,
represented a "shift in legal theory."2 This theory fitted in with "the
basic abstraction of contract law."3 In this period, Friedman states,
the law was most concerned "with problems of reducing business risk
and enhancing the predictable effect of transactions."4
Morton Horwitz's account is somewhat along the same lines.
Horwitz inserts his discussion into his theme of the "transformation"
of contract law from an eighteenth century communitarian font of
fairness and justice to a nineteenth century mercantile vehicle for risk
taking. This transformation resulted in objective standards of market
values, and objective criteria for determining the existence and
interpretation of contracts.5
* © 2000 Joseph M. Perillo. Distinguished Professor, Fordham University School of
Law. I would like to thank Mark Gergen, Allan Hyde, Bob Kaczoro'ski, Mike
Martin and Val D. Ricks for helpful comments on an earlier draft and Fordham
University for its financial support.




5. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
(1977). Simpson has demolished most aspects of Horwitz's transformation thesis as
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Grant Gilmore's account holds that Christopher Columbus
Langdell invented the generalized notion of contract in 1871,6 which
was brilliantly reformulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,7 and then
propagated by a diligent scrivener named Williston.' Gilmore credits
Holmes with the invention of the objective theory.9 Like Horwitz and
Friedman, Gilmore attributes the creation of late nineteenth century
classical contract doctrine to a response to the same stimuli that gave
rise to laissez-faire economics.10 Gilmore, thus, in most respects
agrees with Friedman's and Horwitz's accounts, but he places the
transformation somewhat later than they do, and places the cause on
three culprits in Harvard Yard.
All three of these accounts are seriously flawed." A more accurate
account of the origins of the objective theory is that objective
approaches have predominated in the common law of contracts since
time immemorial. The account is not seamless; there was a brief but
almost inconsequential flirtation with subjective approaches in the
mid-nineteenth century. The flirtation produced the rhetoric of a
subjective approach but had little effect on the outcome of cases
involving the formation or interpretation of contracts except in cases
of the death or insanity of an offeror. Subjective approaches did,
however, transform the availability of relief for mistake, duress, and
other grounds of avoidance.
The flirtation with the subjective approach to the formation and
interpretation of contracts came to a decisive end when the
legislatures enacted laws allowing parties to testify on their own
behalfs. The adoption of the objective theory was not the product of
brainwashing of the profession by Holmes or any other individual, but
applied to contract law, but does not discuss the objective-subjective issues of
formation and interpretation. A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History
of Contracts, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1979) [hereinafter Simpson, Horwitz Thesis].
6. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 12 (1974). Langdell published the first
contracts casebook in 1871. His text, A Summary of the Law of Contracts, was
published in 1880. Gilmore's history is quite eccentric. The first book with "contract"
in its title was John Joseph Powell, Essay on the Law of Contract (1790). There was a
considerable number of books on the subject of contracts prior to Langdell's.
7. Id. at 14. Holmes' lectures were published in book form entitled The
Common Law in 1881. Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 14.
9. Id. at 35.
10. Gilmore quotes Friedman as follows: "[i]n both theoretical models-that of
the law of contracts and that of liberal economics-parties could be treated as
individual economic units which in theory enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of
decision .... I"d. at 7 (quoting Friedman, supra note 1, at 24-25). Part of this sentence
is also quoted by Gilmore at 95.
11. Sometimes one meets with and is stunned by generalizations such as this: "[a]
standard history of contract doctrine represents that, from the sixteenth to the early
nineteenth century, contract formation depended upon a subjective 'meeting of the
minds."' Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale
L.J. 997, 1042 (1985).
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was the collective product of the legal profession, responding to the
challenge created by the revolutionary change in the rules of evidence.
It is not impossible that the profession was moved by some of the
stimuli that produced a general acceptance in the nineteenth century
of laissez-faire economics, but I have found no evidence to indicate a
link between the reaffirmation of the objective theory and the
economic determinism propounded by some historians. Holmes' role
was to propagate an objective approach that the courts had already
taken a dozen years before he published his objective theory.
I.SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITIES IN CONTRACT
FORMATION AND INTERPRETATION: AN OVERVIEW
There is no single subjective or objective theory. Rather, there are
a variety of different vantage points from which the formation and
interpretation of contracts could conceivably be judged. The legal
system could look solely to the intention of the party who used the
words or other signs in question, or solely to the understanding of the
party to whom those words or signs were directed. Each of these
vantage points is purely subjective; only the subject changes.
It is improbable that any economically developed society would
fully adopt either of these vantage points. One party's intentions
would be subordinated to the idiosyncratic meanings of the other.
More importantly, if the legal system permits parties to testify as to
their understandings or intentions, perjury as to their subjective states
of mind would be extremely difficult to detect.
A third and more balanced subjective test is also conceivable-a
mutual standard "which would allow only such meanings as conform
to an intention common to both or all the parties, and would attach
this meaning although it violates the usage of all other persons."1
This is the classic "meeting of the minds," the "aggregatio mentum"
or "consensus ad idem" of the mid-nineteenth century. It is an
appealing formulation. The essence of contract is agreement and if
the parties' common understanding can be discovered, does not
justice allow, and indeed, dictate that this common understanding be
given effect? This viewpoint prevailed in the mid-nineteenth century
and the turning point away from it came in the 1870's. Its
philosophical foundation was the theory that consensual obligation
stemmed from the will of the promisor.1 3 Spokesmen for this theory
12. Restatement of Contracts § 227(3) (1932). Although the first Restatement
stated this as a possible standard, it did not adopt it.
13. Referring to contract theory on the European continent, Gordley asserts that
the theorists had jettisoned all aspects of medieval natural law theory except the
foundation of contract in the will of the promisor. James Gordley, Contract in Pre-
Commercial Societies and in Western History, in Contracts in General, VII
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law §§ 2-30-2-35 (1997).
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included such continental legal scholars as Hugo Grotius, 4 and
Robert Joseph Pothier.15 Philosophers such as Immanuel Kant16 were
spokesmen for the Will Theory and the theory is alive and well in
France today." Although some observers indicate that in practice
there is little difference in result in the application of the French
subjective approach and the common law's objective approach, the
difference in theory explains, among other things, why in France there
is no definitive rule on whether an acceptance is effective on dispatch
or on receipt. This is because, under the subjective approach, the
meeting of the minds frequently is a question of fact."8 This also helps
to explain many other differences between the French law of offer and
acceptance and its common-law counterpart 9 and the vastly different
interpretive process.2"
Yet, the application of the standard of mutual understanding in
common law systems was in reality quite limited, because neither
party was permitted to testify to his own version of what he
understood the common understanding to be nor to testify that his
own understanding was different from that of the other party.
Consequently, although much substantive law theory was rooted in
subjectivity, the evidentiary proof of the existence of contractual
intent or the meaning of a contractual term was limited to objective
elements-what the parties wrote or signed, what the parties said to
each other (as established by testimony of disinterested persons),
certain exceptions to the hearsay rule (such as the shop-book rule),2"
and circumstantial evidence, provided that this evidence, extrinsic to a
writing, was not further pared down by the parol evidence rule.22
14. See Hugo Grotius, Rights of War and Peace 192-204 (William Whewell trans.,
1853) (1625).
15. See R. J. Pothier, A Treatise on the Contract of Sale 17-24 (L.S. Cushing
trans., 1839) (1762).
16. See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law 102-05, 121-25 (W. Hastie, B.D.
trans., 1887) (1796-97); see also Symposium on Kantian Legal Theory, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 419, 439-46 (autonomy), 495 (free will), 546-47 (promising and meeting of the
minds), 563-68 (promise-keeping as a categorical imperative) (1987).
17. Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract 35, 47-49 (2d ed. 1992).
18. See Pierre Bonassies, Report on French Law, in II Formation of Contracts
(Rudolf B. Schlesinger ed., 1968).
19. See Nicholas, supra note 17, at 61-76.
20. See id. at 47-49.
21. See Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 137-38 (1842).
22. Greenleaf stated the parol evidence rule as follows:
When parties have deliberately put their engagements into writing, in such
terms as import a legal obligation, without any uncertainty as to the object
or extent of such engagement, it is conclusively presumed, that the whole
engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of their undertaking
was reduced to writing; and all oral testimony of a previous colloquium
between the parties, or of conversation or declarations at the time when it
was completed or afterwards... is rejected.
Id. at 315.
This encapsulates more modem statements of the rule, except that today, evidence
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Consequently, contract law, when viewed together with the law of
evidence, was a mixture of subjective and objective elements with the
objective elements dominating the decisions of almost all concrete
cases.
Objective tests also vary. There is the viewpoint of general usage,23
which, if rigidly adhered to, spawns the simplistic "plain meaning
rule" or the complex architecture of Williston's objective theory of
interpretation.24 Such a highly objective vantage point may be rather
remote from the perspectives of the parties and may produce an
interpretation that conforms to the intention of neither party.z5 This
perspective subordinates the parties' intentions to the intrinsic
meaning of words.2' Other, possibly less remote, vantage points may
be that of the usage of a particular locality or trade. Even less remote
objective vantage points are the perspectives of the reasonable person
in the party who employed the words or signs and the vantage point of
the reasonable person in the position of the addressee of the words or
signs.
Objective approaches to words spoken or written by only one party
are based on the reasonable expectations of the promisor, or the
promisee. The latter perspective, focusing on the expectation of the
promisor, articulated by Dr. Paley, had quite a following in the
nineteenth century.' The perspective of the promisee was articulated
by Adam Smith whose critique of the Will Theory, however, was not
published until the twentieth century. He said, "[w]e may observe
here that the obligation to perform a promise can not proceed from
the will of the person to be obliged, as some authors imagine. For if
that were the case a promise which one made without an intention to
perform it would never be binding."' 2 According to Smith, serious
promises are binding "and the reason is plain: they produce the same
of statements made subsequent to adoption of the writing are not barred by the rule.
John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 3.2 (4th ed. 1998).
23. See Restatement of Contracts § 227(1) (1932).
24. Williston's rules are sketched in Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22, § 3.11.
25. "When the language of the contract is clear, the court will presume that the
parties intended what they expressed, even if the expression differs from the parties'
intentions at the time they created the contract." Nicholson Air Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 706 A.2d 124, 132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); see Restatement of
Contracts § 230 illus. 1 (1932).
26. For one of many such statements, see Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 650,
662-63 (K.B. 1833) ("Unfortunately, however, they have used words which will not,
we think, effectuate that intention. The question in this and other cases of
construction of written instruments is, not what was the intention of the parties, but
what is the meaning of the words they have used."). But one finds an occasional
enlightened case holding that words of art can be overcome by other language found
in a written instrument. See, e.g., Sherman's Lessee v. Dill, 4 Yeates 295 (Pa. 1806).
27. Paley's influence on the interpretive process is discussed infra in Part IV.B.
28. Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 93 (RL. Meek, D.D. Raphael & P.
G. Stein eds., 1978) (lectures of 1762-63).
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degree of dependance and... dissappointment." 19
Alongside any subjective or objective approach, the parol evidence
rule provides its own highly objective strictures. Under the parol
evidence rule, courts must, subject to some qualifications and
exceptions, exclude evidence of terms agreed upon between the
parties prior to or contemporaneously with the adoption of a written
contract. When this rule operates to exclude a term actually agreed
upon by the parties, its operation is akin to the application of the
standard of general usage in that it results in enforcement of a
contract that is different from a contract objectively manifested by the
parties to each other. Rather, the contract as enforced is the contract
that hypothetical reasonably prudent persons similarly situated would
have made.30
II. OBJECTIVE APPROACHES PRIOR TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
A. Pre-Nineteenth Century Approach to Formation
Few doubt that, prior to the last decades of the eighteenth century,
the common law of contract formation and interpretation was highly
objective. In Doctor and Student, an early sixteenth-century text, the
student of common law explains to the doctor of divinity that "the
intent inward in the heart, man's law cannot judge,' 31 and a promise is
binding if there is a "charge by reason of the promise. ' 32 The student
professes to be surprised that the canon law might regard a promise
uttered without an intention to carry it out as non-binding, "which
cannot be, as me seemeth" because "the law canon [would] judge
upon the inward intent of the heart." According to the student of the
common law, only God's law judges inward things.3 The law of God
is something other than the law of reason or the law of man, although
aspects of the law of reason and the law of man may be based on
God's law. God metes out the punishment for violations of His law,3
29. Id.
30. See Restatement of Contracts § 230 (1932) (illustrating the standard of
interpretation for integrations).
31. Christopher Saint Germain, Doctor and Student; or, Dialogues Between a
Doctor of Divinity and a Student in the Laws of England 179 (Legal Classics Library
1988) (1530-41). Saint Germain's name sometimes is styled as "St. German."
32. Id. Examples, given by the student, of "charges" include "[aInd if a man say
to another, heal such a poor man of his disease, or, make an highway, and I will give
thee thus much; and if he do it, I think an action lieth at the Common law." Id. at 179-
80. These examples, in modem parlance, are promises for a bargained-for exchange,
the core of the modem doctrine of consideration.
33. Id. at 179; cf. 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 597 n.5 (1960) ("In an
ancient case, Y.B. 17 Edw. IV, 2, Brian, C.J., remarked, perhaps erroneously, that 'the
devil himself knoweth not the thought of man."').
34. "[T]hat no evil should be unpunished, it was necessary to have the law of God
that should leave no evil unpunished." Saint Germain, supra note 31, at 10.
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and the student of the common law is convinced that the
determination of the inward state of mind of a contracting party must
be left to God. The student's concern is evidentiary.
The student further illustrates the objective theory of contract
formation in this passage: "if a man say to another, marry my
daughter, and I will give thee twenty pounds; upon this promise an
action lieth, if he marry his daughter. And in this case he cannot
discharge the promise though he thought not to be bound thereby; for
it is a good contract .... 3S
B. Interpretation
Two decades after Doctor and Student was published, Chief Justice
Brook engaged in a detailed discussion of his objective theory of
interpretation. The question was whether the legal meaning of the
words of a grant should be given preference over the otherwise clear
and obvious intention of the grantor. Brook, from the bench,
declared: "[t]he party ought to direct his meaning according to the
law, and not the law according to his meaning .... "3 Brook
supported his conclusion by stating that "if a man should bend the law
to the intent of the party, rather than the intent of the party to the law,
this would be the way to introduce barbarousness and ignorance, and
to destroy all learning and diligence." a Giving effect to the party's
meaning instead of the meaning of the words would induce
carelessness and give rise to uncertainty.3s To his brethren on the
bench Brook explains by referring to a simple precedent.39 An abbot
granted a croft' to the grantee in exchange for the grantee's deed
renouncing his rights to a common. The renunciation was held to be
void because the renunciation did not state to whom the renunciation
ran. "[Y]et there the intent was plain, for he had common in the land
of the abbot, and his meaning was to release it to the abbot. ..."
Despite the plain meaning of the deed, it was objectively void. Words
have, according to this theory, their own intrinsic meaning; their
expression-or in this case their absence-overrides the intention of
the parties, even though the intended meaning can be deduced from
the instrument itself.
The early common law was replete with cases where the courts
knowingly thwarted the intent of the parties. As Judge Cardozo
35. Id- at 180 (emphasis supplied).
36. Throckmerton v. Tracy, 75 Eng. Rep. 222,251 (1(B. 1816).
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id. (citing to H. 13 Ed. 3).
40. A croft is "[a] little close adjoining a dwelling house, and inclosed for pasture
and tillage or any particular use. A small place fenced off in which to keep farm-
cattle." Black's Law Dictionary 375 (6th ed. 1990).
41. Throckmerton, 75 Eng. Rep. at 251.
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stated in 1917, "[t]he law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and
every slip was fatal."4 Cardozo may well have had cases such as that
of the abbot and the croft in mind when he penned those words.
C. Other Pre-Nineteenth Century Objective Rules Protecting the
Written Word
The common law rule was that a contract under seal could not be
modified or discharged except by a sealed instrument.43 Writings
under seal could not be controverted or varied by written or oral
evidence because sealed writings were of a higher nature than mere
written evidence or testimony." Payment without a sealed
acquittance was held to be no defense and, as one court is reported to
have said, "'it is inconvenient in law that one should avoid a specialty
by a nude matter of fact."' 45  The writing overrode prior,
contemporaneous, and subsequent expressions of intention.
Another objective rule concerned the alteration of a sealed
instrument. Lord Coke in Pigot's Case46 stated that "it was resolved,
that [] when any deed is altered in a point material by the plaintiff
himself, or by any stranger, without the privity of the obligee... the
deed thereby becomes void."'47 If instead of a stranger, a mouse or rat
should eat the seal of an obligor affixed to a covenant, the obligor
whose seal had been eaten was discharged along with joint obligors
whose seals were intact.48 The physical document overrode the
42. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
43. See Wm. L. Clark, Jr., Handbook of the Law of Contracts § 262 (1894).
44. Francis Bacon wrote: "Ambiguitas Patens is never holpen by averrement, and
the reason is, because the law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is
of the higher account, with matter of averrement, which is of inferior account in law;
for that were to make all deedes hollow ...." Francis Bacon, The Elements of the
Common Laws of England 91 (photo. reprint 1978) (1630).
45. Eric Mills Holmes, 3 Corbin on Contracts § 10.15 n.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
West Publ'g Co. 1996) (1950) (quoting Y.B. 1 Hen. 7, 14, 2). In some jurisdictions,
the rule persisted well into the twentieth century. See Cammack v. J. B. Slattery &
Bro., Inc. 148 N.E. 781 (N.Y. 1925). It may be alive somewhere. See Holmes, § 10.15
n.3 (stating that "[t]here are unreversed cases to the same effect in other states that
have not abolished seals.").
46. 77 Eng. Rep. 1177 (K.B. 12 Jac.).
47. Id. at 1178.
48. Cited for this proposition is Bayley v. Garford, 82 Eng. Rep. 441 (C.P. 17
Car.I), although the court merely set the case for reargument. Nonetheless,
subsequent cases treated it as binding precedent. In Seaton v. Henson, 83 Eng. Rep.
527 (K.B. 30 Car.II) also reported in 2 Show. 28, 89 Eng. Rep. 772, where the seal of
one joint obligor was broken off, Bayley v. Garford was treated as the governing
precedent. In Nichols v. Haywood, 73 Eng. Rep. 130 (K.B. 36 and 37 Hen. 8), the
case was distinguished because the rodents feasted after issue was joined while the
document was in the custody of the court clerk. See generally, Samuel Williston,
Discharge of Contracts by Alteration, I, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1904), II, 18 Harv. L.
Rev. 165 (1905) (describing other situations in which a contract was discharged).
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intention of the parties. A bond under seal that was lost could not be
proved by secondary evidence until 1789.49
At one stage of English legal history, a stolen signet ring that was
used to seal a covenant bound the owner of the ring. Appearance
overrode intention.
The various branches of the parol evidence rule also subordinated
intention to the appearance of intention as reflected in a writing.5 The
parol evidence rule was not needed to protect instruments under seal
as such instruments were constitutive; the documents were themselves
the contracts and were impervious to parol evidence. Unsealed
contracts became more common in the later Middle Ages and during
the Renaissance. To protect such writings, the parol evidence rule
was created. "By the late seventeenth century, a modem parol
evidence rule for contracts had taken shape. '""
Oral contracts were less constrained by rules of formality until the
enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 1677.- The requirement of
written evidence was then imposed on a considerable number of
contracts, particularly contracts that were high on the economic scale.
II. THE TRANSITION FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO THE NINETEENTH
CENTURIES
Starting in the late eighteenth century, courts and text writers began
to shift from looking solely to the inherent meaning of the words of
the parties, to the intentions of the parties. Although they frequently
employed subjective rhetoric and later commentators sometimes
looked at the decisions of this era through a subjective lens, in this era
the intention of the parties was gleaned solely by an analysis of the
parties' words and other outward indicia of intention.
49. See A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract 95 (reprint
1987) (1975), citing Read v. Brookman, 3 T.R. 151, 100 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1789)
[hereinafter Simpson, Common Law of Contract].
50. See John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law 15 (3d ed. 1940).
51. Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Anglo-American Common Law of
Contract 110 n.240 (1990).
The parol evidence rule seems to have caught on by the early part of the
eighteenth century since it appeared in Lilly's Practical Register 48 (1719),
as quoted in 5 C. Viner, A General Abridgment of Law and Equity 515-516
(1742) (If an agreement made by parol to do anything be afterwards reduced
into writing, action must be brought on the writing because of its greater
certainty, citing a 1681 case.).
Id.
52. Id. at 89.
53. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and
Dysfunctions of Form, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 39 n.1 (1974).
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A. The Misunderstood Case of Cooke v. Oxley
The case of Cooke v. Oxley,' decided in 1790, is often tendered as
proof that a subjective theory of contracts prevailed in the late
eighteenth century.5 In fact, however, the case was about
consideration and was totally unconcerned with issues of subjective or
objective intention. In Cooke, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
proposed to sell the plaintiff 266 hogsheads of tobacco and gave him
until 4:00 p.m. to agree or dissent from the proposal. The plaintiff
further alleged that he gave notice of his agreement to defendant by
4:00 p.m. of that date. The King's Bench reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff, after hearing plaintiff's counsel and stopping defendant's
counsel before he commenced argument.
Today's reader is likely to read the case as establishing the
proposition that the offeror's subjective change of mind, even if
uncommunicated, is sufficient to revoke an offer. Such a reading is
anti-historical. The case simply meant that no offer is binding unless
immediately accepted because there is no consideration to make it
binding. It was so understood by the legal profession for the next two
decades and the case itself was argued and decided on the basis of
consideration. The reporter stated that a rule had "been obtained to
shew cause why the judgement should not be arrested, on the ground
that there was no consideration for the defendant's promise. 5 6 In
deciding the case, Lord Kenyon pointed out that the proposal "was all
on one side; the other party was not bound; it was therefore nudum
pactum,"57 a term of art in consideration doctrine. In concurring,
Justice Grose stated "there is no consideration for the promise 5' and
Justice Buller pointed out that there is no advantage to the defendant
and no damage to the plaintiff in exchange for the promise made
earlier the same day, 9 thus stating the core of modern consideration
doctrine.
In terms of offer and acceptance, the case was an application of the
principle laid down in the case of Nichols v. Raynbred.60 In that 1615
case, it was held that a promise was sufficient consideration for a
promise, but the report warned: "[n]ote here the promises must be at
54. 3 T.R. 653, 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B. 1790).
55. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.17 n.16 (3d ed. 1999) (labeling Cooke
v. Oxley "a confusing relic of the subjective era"); John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray
on Contracts § 41 n.34 (The Michie Co. 3d ed. 1990); 1 Samuel Williston, The Law of
Contracts § 56 n.48 (1920). But see A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century
Contract Law, 91 L.Q. Rev. 247,261 (1975).
56. 3 T.R. at 653, 100 Eng. Rep. at 786.
57. 3 T.R. at 654, 100 Eng. Rep. at 786.
58. 3 T.R. at 654, 100 Eng. Rep. at 786.
59. 3 T.R. at 654, 100 Eng. Rep. at 786.
60. Hobart 88, 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B. 1615); see also Kirkby v. Coles, Cro. Eliz.
137, 78 Eng. Rep. 394 (Q. B. 31 Eliz.).
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one instant, for else they will both be nuda pacta. 61 Cooke v. Oxley
was so explained in 1804 by James Kent in one of his typically
scholarly and conservative opinions for the New York Supreme
Court.62 Kent wrote that:
[t]his is a case of mutual promises, where the one is intended to be
the consideration for the other. It is a well settled rule that in such
cases the promises must be stated to have been made at the same
time. Otherwise the one antecedently made will be without
consideration, and consequently, not sufficient to support the
other.63
Plaintiff argued that the maxim to the effect that the law ignores
fractions of a day should be applied. Kent, however, stated that the
maxim "is repugnant to the case of Cooke v. Oxley."'46 He continued,
stating, "[i]t is clear, therefore, from the last decision and from the
reason of the thing, that mutual promises, where one is the
consideration of the other, must be made not only on the same day,
but at the same time; they must be concurrent engagements."'
The theory stating that offer and acceptance must be simultaneous
seems incredible doctrine in mercantile jurisdictions such as 1790
England and 1804 New York.66 Were contracts by correspondence
legal impossibilities? The reports indicate that contracts were made
by correspondence and litigation concerning them sometimes
proceeded without reference to their initial validity,67 perhaps because
the doctrine of simultaneous offer and acceptance did not apply to
offers to unilateral contracts, 68 or to contracts that had become
unilateral by performance of one side of a bilateral agreement. 69
Yet, the argument that the offer and acceptance must be
simultaneous was made frequently enough to cast doubt on the
validity of contracts by correspondence. For example, in Head &
Amory v. Providence Insurance Co.,70 the plaintiff in Boston on
61. Hobart 88, 80 Eng. Rep. at 238.
62. See Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Cai. R. 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
63. Id. at 584-85. Kent cited Cooke v. Oxley for this point. His citation was to the
case as reported in 3 D. & E. 653.
64. Id. at 584.
65. Id. at 585.
66. That merchants may have learned to cope with the impractical rule of Cooke
v. Oxley is suggested by Hunphries v. Carvalho, 16 East 45, 104 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007
(K.B. 1812). The court upheld a sale of 5 casks of ipecacuanha made on a Saturday
with an option by the buyer to terminate on the following Monday. While for many
purposes such a contract is functionally identical to an irrevocable offer, the contract
differs from an offer as to such issues such as risk of loss.
67. Ludlow v. Bowne, 1 Johns. 1 (N.Y. 1806); Read v. Gaillard, 2 S.C. Eq. (2 Des.)
552 (1808).
68. See Simpson, Common Law of Contract, supra note 49, at 458-59. Read, 2 S.C.
Eq. (2 Des.) 552, was such a case.
69. Ludlow, 1 Johns. at 1, was such a case.
70. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804).
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September 3, 1800 mailed an offer to its insurer in Providence to
rescind a policy of insurance on a vessel believed to be in Havana in
need of repair. On September 6, the defendant dispatched a letter
assenting to the offer. Soon thereafter, it was learned that, prior to
this correspondence, the vessel had sailed from Havana, and had been
captured and condemned as a prize by a foreign power.
The issue before the court was the validity of the mutual rescission
agreed to by correspondence. John Quincy Adams, for the defendant,
ridiculed the notion of a contract by correspondence. He questioned
the justice of the plaintiff being bound on the third and the defendant
on the 6th.71 His co-counsel, Mason, cited Cooke v. Oxley as authority
for Adams' oratory. 72 Chief Justice Marshall, for the Court, was able
to avoid the question by ruling for the plaintiff on the grounds that the
defendant insurer's letter did not bear the signature and seal of an
officer authorized by its by-laws to contract for the corporation.73
Only with the 1818 decision in the case of Adams v. Lindsell did a
common law court hold that a bilateral contract could be formed by
correspondence, although Chancery had upheld such contracts. 74 As
late as 1815, the New York Court followed Cooke v. Oxley.75 As in
the prior cases, the ruling was based solely on consideration analysis.
Intention was not made to be the issue.
71. Id. at 148. In a Pennsylvania case, a trust deed for the benefit of creditors was
executed on a Saturday, a sheriff's execution took place on Monday, and the trustee
accepted the deed on Wednesday. The court held that the acceptance related back to
Saturday. Wilt v. Franklin, 1 Binn. 502 (Pa. 1809). This was one possible answer to
Adams' question.
72. Head, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 160.
73. Marshall also avoided the same issue in Lawrason v. Mason, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
492, 494 (1806). Defendant's counsel argued for the application of Cooke v. Oxley,
saying "[t]here was no consideration, and consequently no contract." Id. at 494
(quoting Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T.R. 653). However, the case may have been inapplicable
because (1) the offer was to a unilateral contract, and (2) the case involved a letter of
credit governed by the law merchant. The case was decided on unrelated grounds.
74. See Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Mer. 442, 36 Eng. Rep. 170 (Ch. 1817).
75. See Keep v. Goodrich, 12 Johns. 397, 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (Spencer, J.).
Massachusetts applied Cooke v. Oxley in 1822. Neither the court nor counsel made
reference to Adams v. Lindsell. M'Culloch v. The Eagle Ins. Co., 18 Mass. (1 Pick.)
278 (1822). Although Cooke v. Oxley has been applied in some later cases, none of
these applications seem to have involved the "mailbox rule." As late as 1887 we find
this in an American textbook:
[T]o constitute a contract in fact, the two or more parties must concurrently
assent to exactly the same thing at the same instant of time. So that, if one
consents... at one time and the latter at another, by reason of which their
wills do not at any instant completely coincide, they do not enter into a
contract.
Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Contracts § 313, at 119 (1887).
Earlier, in 1844, W.W. Story had written that the offer and acceptance must be
simultaneous, citing a variety of sources based on Nichols v. Raynbred. William
Wentworth Story, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts not under Seal § 128, at 81
(reprint 1972) (1844). Elsewhere, however, his treatise recognized the rule of Adams
v. Lindsell. Id. §§ 84, 86.
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B. Was Adams v. Lindsell Based on a Subjective Theory?
The above discussion shows that Cooke v. Oxley was most definitely
not based on a subjective theory. Curiously, some scholars who claim
that Cooke v. Oxley was based on subjective thinking also claim that
Adams v. Lindsell,76 which overruled it, was also based on a subjective
theory.' One cannot gather from the report of the case whether a
subjective or objective theory nurtured the court's decision. The court
seems to have had the pragmatic goal of finding a rationale to uphold
the formation of contracts by correspondence.
The report of the case is terse. The court saw the issue in very
practical terms. If an offer could not be accepted by mail, "no
contract could ever be completed by the post."'  Moreover, "if the
defendants [offerors] were not bound by their offer when accepted by
the plaintiffs till the answer [acceptance] was received, then the
plaintiffs ought not to be bound till after they had received the
notification that the defendants had received their answer and
assented to it. And so it might go on ad infinitum." Clearly, at this
point, no subjective or objective theory of contract formation had
been propounded. The discussion is grounded in purely practical
terms. The following sentence is said to have been the subjective
theoretical underpinning of the holding: "The defendants must be
considered in law as making, during every instant of the time their
letter was traveling, the same identical offer to the plaintiffs; and then
the contract is completed by the acceptance of it by the latter."' With
76. 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
77. See Murray, supra note 55, at 148, which states that Adams v. Lindsell -was
decided when the subjective theory of mutual assent was still prevalent." My point
here is that the common law's flirtation with the subjective theory had not yet
seriously begun.
Another scholar wrote, "[t]his subjective theory of formation was firmly established
by the end of the eighteenth century," citing Adams v. Lindsell and Cooke v. Oxley.
Dalton, supra note 11, at 1042 n.150. Moreover, Teeven takes the position that Cooke
v. Oxley was based on subjective thinking and that "the subjective standard was
reinforced" by Adams v. Lindsell. Teeven, supra note 51, at 182.
7& Adams, 106 Eng. Rep. at 251.
79. 1&
80. Id. There are three possible sources for this language and the thought behind
it: (1) Pothier says much the same thing. "[T]he will of the party, who makes a
proposition in writing, should continue until his letter reaches the other party ....
This will is presumed to continue, if nothing appears to the contrary...." Pothier,
supra note 15, at 18. But under Pothier's test no contract would have been formed in
Adams v. Lindsell because the defendant's sale of the subject matter appeared to the
contrary. (2) The thought is consistent with the common law past-benefit cases. For
example Beaucamp, at Neggin's request, paid £10 to C. See Beaucamp v. Neggin, 78
Eng. Rep. 536, 536 (K.B. 1591). A year later, Neggin promised Beaucamp
reimbursement. See id In holding the promise to be enforceable, the court stated,
"when the payment is laid to be at his request, the consideration doth continue." Id.
Another such case is Barker v. Halifax, 78 Eng. Rep. 974 (1598) ("[Tjhat an assumpsit
in consideration that you had married my daughter, to give unto you £40 was good;
for the affection and consideration always continues."). (3) Chancery said much the
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this language the court indulged in the fiction of the continuance of
the offeror's original intention while the letter of acceptance was
being transported by post office employees, despite the contrary
subjective intentions of the offerors. While the test would have been
subjective if one accepted the fiction rather than the reality of
simultaneous assent,81 it was an objective test in this respect: he
offeree had objectively manifested assent by posting the letter of
acceptance, notwithstanding the failure of communication to the
offerors themselves. Strong objectivists such as Holmes' and
Williston 83 found the holding to be in accord with their basic objective
theories, although Williston is somewhat half-hearted in his
endorsement of the holding of the case. It is interesting to note that in
France, the bastion of subjectivism, on similar facts a Cour d'appel has
ruled that no contract was made because "there had been no moment
at which the intention to offer and the intention to accept had co-
existed."'
The reasoning in the Chancery cases that had, prior to Adams v.
Lindsell, enforced contracts by correspondence, bears examination.
In Kennedy v. Lee, Lord Eldon stated that "it has been long since
settled, as the doctrine of the Court, that such agreements, when
clearly made out, will be established."' 5 Eldon further stated that "the
law of the Court [was] ... that, if a person communicates his
acceptance of an offer within a reasonable time after the offer being
made... the acceptance must be taken as simultaneous with the offer,
and both together as constituting such an agreement as the Court will
execute."86 Thus, the fiction of simultaneity neatly dodged the dictum
of Nicholas v. Raynbred.7 A fiction can hardly be said to be based on
the will of the parties.
same thing in enforcing contracts by correspondence prior to Adams v. Lindsell in
Kennedy v. Lee, quoted infra at text accompanying note 85. Chancery's statement is
likely to have been based either on (1) or (2) above or some combination of the two.
81. The first Restatement of Contracts indicated that there were at least six
vantage points from which the meaning of language could be viewed. See
Restatement of Contracts § 227 (1932). These were (1) general usage, (2) limited
usage-local or trade meanings, (3) a mutual standard, (4) an individual standard, (5)
reasonable expectation-the intention the speaker or writer would expect the
addressee to understand, and (6) reasonable understanding-the reasonable
understanding of the addressee of the language. See id. cmt. a. Comment b to the
section indicates that the third and fourth vantage points are subjective. See id. cmt. b.
I am doubtful about categorizing the third vantage point as "subjective." For
example, is a mutually agreed-upon secret code "subjective?"
82. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 305-06 (1881).
83. See 1 Williston, supra note 55, § 81, at 144.
84. Nicholas, supra note 17, at 68 (citing Bordeaux 17.1.1870, S. 1870.2.219).
85. 36 Eng. Rep. 170, 173 (Ch. 1817).
86. Id. at 175.
87. 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B. 1615); see also supra text accompanying notes 60-61
(discussing Nicholas v. Raynbred).
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Kennedy v. Lee, however, was not primarily a case about formation.
The parties disagreed about the interpretation of their contract. On
this point, Eldon, personified objectivity itself. The parties were in
disagreement about the scope of the subject matter of their contract.
After stating that the parties ought to point out to the court based on
the face of the contract what the subject matter was, he continued:
I do not mean (because the cases which have been decided would
not bear me out in going so far), that I am to see that both parties
really meant the same precise thing, but only that both actually gave
their assent to that proposition which, be it what it may, de facto
arises out of the terms of the correspondence.O
He concludes this passage by stating that the letters must be
construed as if they constituted a formal instrument.
Adams v. Lindsell, for a variety of reasons, acquired fame and much
has been read into it. Subsequent glosses on the case describe the
mailing of a letter of acceptance as a "meeting of the minds."' Such a
gloss was created during the common law's flirtation with a subjective
theory of contracts, but does not provide a basis for understanding the
original rationale of the case.
C. Stare Decisis in Early Nineteenth Century America
The judges of the early American republic were firm adherents of
the doctrine of stare decisis. This adherence is based on the same
foundations as the objective approach to contracts. Pursuant to stare
decisis, doing justice was not the job of the court if precedent
demanded injustice. Typical is the case of Hallett v. Wylie. ° The
defendant tenant had leased a house for a term of four years. Seven
months after commencement of the term, the house was consumed by
fire. Judge Van Ness acknowledged that "[t]his is a hard case upon
the defendant; and if the court could, consistently with settled and
established principles, relieve him against the payment of the rent in
question, we should most willingly do it."'" The court made it clear
that it viewed its function as applying the law, not making it.' In a
Massachusetts case, an agent had authority to borrow money on the
credit of his principals, but no express authority to execute a sealed
instrument. It was successfully argued that an instrument signed and
sealed by the agent could not serve to bind the principal. The court
remarked, "and although this objection is merely technical, I have not
been able, with much labor, and a strong inclination, to get over it. A
8& Kennedy, 36 Eng. Rep. at 174.
89. E.g., Mactier's Adm'r v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103, 119 (N.Y. 1830).
90. 3 Johns. 44 (N.Y. 1808).
91. Id. at 46.
92. The court put this thought in Latin: "[w]e sit here 'Jus dare,' not "jus facere'."
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desire to do justice ought not lead us astray from the rules of
law .... , Two years earlier, another judge of the same court stated,
"[s]o far the law has provided; and we do not profess to be wiser than
the law."94
In a 1797 Maryland case, William Pinkney successfully argued for
the appellant. Among the arguments he made, none of which would
likely be made by a lawyer today, were the following. Pinkney told
the court, "[a]bsurdity is no argument against [a rule] if it is law, nor
its inconvenience."'95 He points out the lack of the courts' authority to
rectify absurdities, stating "[a] man of plain sense would be shocked at
the absurdity of one third of the old common law, which has been
since changed by acts of parliament, or acts of assembly; yet it was law
till it was altered."96 He then explains his view of the philosophical
foundations of law stating that:
[t]he law is an artificial system, which must not be judged of by the
ordinary rules of reason. It is a technical science; any known system
is better than none. It is of importance to society that the rules of
justice should not be fluctuating; that they should be fixed, and
settled, and permanent. 97
The desire for certainty, expressed by Pinkney, appears throughout
the jurisprudence of the early republic.98 Pinkney was no eccentric,
but rather was a prominent diplomat who served as James Madison's
Attorney-General, and then became an influential congressman."
93. Banorgee v. Hovey, 5 Mass. 11, 23 (1809). Although the courts did not have
the power to direct verdicts, grant summary judgments or judgments n.o.v., they did
not look with favor on jury nullification. In Wilkie v. Roosevelt, 3 Johns. Cas. 206
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802), the jury twice found for the plaintiff despite the uncontroverted
evidence that the plaintiff's loan to the defendant was usurious. The court ordered a
third trial, saying, "[i]f the statute against usury is an unconscientious defense, or the
law impolitic, it is the province of the Legislature to repeal it. But as long as it
remains in force, it is the indispensable duty of a court and jury to carry it into effect."
Id. at 208-09.
94. Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71, 73 (1807).
95. Beane v. Middleton, 4 H. & McH. 74, 78 (Md. 1797) (emphasis in original).
Similarly, in Paca's Lessee v. Forwood, 2 H. & McH. 175, 179-81 (Md. 1787), a deed
commenced with the words "this indenture" but was not indented. Plaintiff's
successful argument was that "[tihough indenting may be considered as a mere
ceremony," it was necessary and therefore the deed was void, and "[a]ll writers agree,
that indenting is a necessary circumstance to constitute a deed of bargain and sale."
Id. at 178-79.
96. Beane, 4 H. & McH. at 78.
97. Id. at 79.
98. See, e.g., Williams v. Hodgson, 2 H. & J. 474, 483 (Md. 1809) ("[T]he
chancellor's decree, however consonant to strict justice, ought to be reversed.");
Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. 1, 13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) ("It is the very nature of
general rules, to sometimes operate harshly .... "); Hall v. Shultz, 4 Johns. 240, 244
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) ("[Courts of law cannot enforce moral duties, or relieve
particular hardships, without a legal basis."); Davy v. Hallett, 3 Cai. R. 16 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1805) (certainty in measuring an insurance loss).
99. See 22 Encyclopedia Americana 117 (1984).
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William Nelson's study of the post-revolutionary era in Massachusetts
makes it clear that ideas similar to Pinkney's were also prevalent in
that Commonwealth. 10°
Despite the fear of perjury and other falsified evidence, the judges
and lawyers of this era were respectful of the rules handed down by
the English common law and equity. Thus, equitable estoppel,
whereby a party relied on the express statement of another'01 or on
the other's silence,"° was an acceptable doctrine despite the possibility
of perjury in its implementation.
Change did come, very slowly, though. According to Nelson's
study, it was not until the 1820's that the courts became comfortable
with the possibility of departing from precedent, although there had
been prior departures. 3 Writing about legal change for a German
publication, Justice Story in 1834 wrote about America's openness to
civil law influences."° As to contracts, Story wrote:
The law with regard to personal or movable property, and contracts,
(often called in the language of common law, choses in action) is in
substance that of England.... except that the American law on
these subjects is more expansive and comprehensive, and liberal,
borrowing freely from the law of Continental Europe, and more
disposed to avail itself of the best principles of commerce, which can
be gathered from all foreign sources not excluding even the civil
law.105
D. Interpretation in the First Decades of the Nineteenth Century
Case law in the early new republic of the United States took starkly
objective approaches to the enforcement of contracts. These
approaches included the rule that parties and other interested persons
were incompetent to testify. The parol evidence rule was enforced
with vigor. The Statute of Frauds was extolled. The special rules
attending sealed instruments that were imported from England
remained intact.
In 1810, America's earliest law-treatise writer defended the rule
excluding a party from testifying on the party's own behalf as follows:
"[t]o admit a party to a contract to support it by his own testimony in
an action brought upon it, would destroy all security for our
100. See William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law 96 (1975).
101. See Lewis v. Gray, 1 Mass. 297 (1805).
102. See Engle v. Bums, 9 Va. (5 Call) 463 (1805); Buckner v. Smith, 1 Va. (1
Wash.) 296 (1794). The related doctrine of "apparent authority" was also honored.
See Hooe v. Oxley, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 19,23 (1791).
103. See Nelson, supra note 100, at 171-72.
104. Story's article, entitled American Law, was published in Germany in a
German translation. The original English-language text appears in Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Sketch of American Law, 3 Am. J. Comp. L 3 (1954).
105. Id. at 22.
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property .... ,16 While this quotation defends a rule of evidence, the
rule is to a large extent the functional equivalent of the objective
theory as expounded by Holmes and Wiliston and which found its
way into the first Restatement of Contracts: if the parties could not
testify, evidence of their subjective intention could not easily be
placed into the record.
Another of the principal buttresses of an objective approach to
contract law was and still is the parol evidence rule. In 1802, a
plaintiff alleged that he had conveyed land to the defendant for a
price and that the defendant orally had promised to pay
proportionally more if a survey showed that the tract exceeded in
acreage the amount estimated. This evidence was excluded. A
contrary ruling, the Connecticut court stated, "would be the
destruction of all written contracts."'1 7 Even the acknowledgment of a
deed, botched by a judge who took the acknowledgment, could not be
supplemented by parol evidence."' 8 The "plain meaning rule," a close
relative to the parol evidence rule, also appears in early reported
cases. 1°9 Interestingly, the plain meaning rule was also stringently
applied to the interpretation of statutes from the eighteenth to the
mid-nineteenth centuries, and frequently, later. 10 Interpretation was a
hateful process to persons raised in the British Protestant tradition, as
well as to the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Both traditions
professed paramount attachment to the text rather than to the
intention that lay behind the text.'
Reformation is a remedy that sometimes allows the redrafting of a
writing to conform to the intention of the parties, but Chancellor
Desaussure of South Carolina would refuse to reform an instrument
that created a trust of £1,000 for the settlor's brother's "lawfully
106. Zephaniah Swift, A Digest of the Law of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases
and a Treatise on Bills of Exchange 99 (1810).
107. Northrup v. Speary, 1 Day 23, 27 (Conn. 1802); see also Bull v. Talcot, 2 Root
119 (Conn. 1794); Bradley v. Blodget, Kirby 22 (Conn. 1786).
108. See Watson's Lessee v. Bailey, 1 Binn. 470, 1808 WL 1490, at *4 (Pa. 1808)
("We may regret that the unskilfulness or negligence of the scrivener had led to this
error; but we are bound to say ita lex scripta est, and the party must abide by
consequences of his own acts.").
109. See Cook v. Ambrose, Add. 322 (Pa. C. 1797). Although modem texts and
Restatements treat the question of using parol evidence to interpret a contract as a
distinct question from the parol evidence rule concerning additional terms of a
contract, this separation is a twentieth century event. See Greenleaf, supra note 21, at
315-54, where they are treated as aspects of the same doctrine.
110. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. Rev. 204,215-16 (1980).
111. These propositions are proved in detail in H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985). For additional
information on the survival of extreme textualism among Protestant Fundamentalists
and the possible parallel survival among some legal analysts, see generally Vincent
Crapanzano, Serving the Word, Literalism in America from the Pulpit to the Bench
(2000).
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begotten children." Evidence was proffered that the settlor's
intention and instructions to the scrivener was to benefit only the
children of his brother's first marriage. The chancellor wrote: "[i]t
would, indeed, be highly mischievous, and tend to the endangering all
property ... if such parol testimony should be admitted."' 12 The parol
evidence rule is "founded in great wisdom and caution. It would tend
greatly to introduce perjuries ... to the great hazard of the titles of all
property.""' 3 Earlier, the North Carolina court had warned of the
"great danger.., of controlling deeds by parol testimony."" 4 If there
was any gap ("chasm") to be filled in an instrument, it "shall be
supplied by the Court according to the intention of the parties, if
possible to be collected from the instrument; if not, then from the
rules of law, or the usages customary in such" transactions."5
The Statute of Frauds requires objective (written) evidence of
certain important kinds of contracts. In 1798, Chancellor Hanson of
Maryland, writing about the Statute, pledged, "[a]nd this court ...
will never destroy that safeguard which the legislature has provided
for the protection of property, and the prevention of fraud and
imposition."'" 6 Chancellor Rutledge of South Carolina expressed his
belief in the intent as well as the letter of the statute and was gratified
that judges of the present day were being stricter in its application." 7
That the fear of perjury and fraudulent evidence as a tool for
filching property was greater than any philosophical notion of the
superiority of objective evidence is shown by another line of cases.
Despite the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence was admissible to
show the falsity of a date on a negotiable instrument" 8 or a deed. 119
Why? Because "[i]t would be of the most dangerous consequence, to
assert that the dates of deeds are conclusive; the greatest frauds might
thus be committed."" Indeed, one fact pattern in which evidence of
subjective intention was sought and admitted was to uncover whether
a conveyance was fraudulent.' Clearly, this rule favoring the
admissibility of this parol evidence is for the protection of the
112. Holmes v. Simons, 20 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 149, 152 (1810).
113. Id at 153.
114. Bradford v. Hill, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 22, 23 (1793) (counsel's argument accepted
by the court).
115. Tabb v. Archer, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 399, 417 (1809) (emphasis in original).
116. Simmons v. Hill, 4 H. & McH. 252, 258 (Md. 1798). Hanson was the first
president of the United States under the Articles of Confederation.
117. See Givens v. Calder, 20 S.C. Eq. (2 Des.) 171, 189-90 (1803); see also Sears v.
Brink, 3 Johns. 210, 215 (N.Y. 1808) ("It is necessary to the prevention of fraud and
perjury, that the consideration which leads to the promise should be in writing, as the
promise itself.").
118. See Bayley v. Taber, 5 Mass. 286 (1809).
119. See Geiss v. Odenheimer, 4 Yeates 278 (Pa. 1806).
120. Id at 279.
121. See Widgery v. Haskell, 5 Mass. 144 (1809).
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inchoate property rights of creditors." Despite the aversion to parol
evidence where a written instrument existed or was required, some of
the traditional equitable doctrines allowing parol evidence were
continued in this early period.'23 But other mitigating rules in place
today, such as showing that a writing is subject to an oral condition,
were rejected.124
There may be other rationales for the favoring of objective,
especially written, evidence of a contract other than the threat of
property divestment by the medium of perjury. But clearly the first
American law-treatise writer and American judges in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries believed that the threat to
property was dire.
E. Interpretation in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
Authorities generally state that the dominant theory of contract in
the first half of the nineteenth century was a subjective theory. Such a
conclusion is unjustified for the first two decades of the century, but
has some plausibility for later decades. As evidence of the prevalence
of the subjective approach, the works of William Wentworth Story
and Chancellor James Kent are cited."z
In examining the evidence, one is struck by the dissonance between
the language used by Kent and Story and the illustrations that they
give. The junior Story, 126 who wrote the first American law book
devoted solely to contracts, stated that "the contract shall be so
interpreted, as to give effect to the intention of the parties, as far as it
is legal, and mutually understood. 127 He continues, in a tone that is
totally consistent with a subjective theory, as follows: "[w]henever
such intent can be distinctly ascertained, it will prevail, not only in
cases where it is not fully and clearly expressed, but also, even where
it contradicts the actual terms of the agreement.' 2 8 This is strongly
subjective writing such that one would not expect to see in the
122. For similar reasons, it could be shown that a grantee had subjective knowledge
of a prior unrecorded deed. See Ludlow v. Gill, N. Chip. 63 (Vt. 1790).
123. Parol evidence was admissible to show that a deed absolute was a mortgage;
see Washburn v. Merrills, 1 Day 139 (Conn. 1803); Critcher v. Walker, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.)
488 (1810) (found to be a conditional sale); Gay v. Hunt, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 141 (1806);
Wilcox's Heirs v. Morris, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 116 (1806); German v. Gabbald, 3 Binn. 302
(Pa. 1811); Lessee of Thomson v. White, 1 DalI. 424 (Pa. 1789); and that a resulting
trust should be imposed; Ross v. Norvell, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 14 (1791) (that a
conveyance of land was held on an oral trust).
124. See Skinner v. Hendrick, 1 Root 253 (Conn. 1791); Ward v. Lewis, 21 Mass.
518 (1827). But see Field for the use of Oxley v. Biddle, 2 Dall. 171 (Pa. 1792)
(arguably going beyond the English precedents).
125. See Teeven, supra note 51, at 182.
126. William Wentworth Story was the son of his better known father, treatise
writer and Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story.
127. W. W. Story, supra note 75, § 231, at 149.
128. Id.
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common law writing of today. Yet, in proving these assertions, what
evidence does Story provide? He cites, among others, Bache v.
Proctor, a case involving a bond of £2,000 conditioned on a "fair, just
and perfect account, in writing, of all sums received."' 9 Despite the
absence of any language in the bond requiring that the money
accounted for also be paid over, the court, per Lord Mansfield, held
that the clear intention of the parties was that the money should be
paid.' Justice Buller concurred, saying that "the palpable mistake of
a word should not defeat the true intention of the parties. 131 Clearly,
these judges and text-writer Story were thinking of the subjective
intention of the parties, but derived that intention solely from the
writing itself, because extrinsic evidence of intention was barred by
the parol evidence rule, or the related plain meaning rule. Moreover,
even if the case had come under one of the exceptions to the parol
evidence rule, the plaintiff himself could not have testified to throw
light on the meaning of the bond, because parties could not testify."
The dissonance between subjective rhetoric and objective result was
not due to hypocrisy or lack of intelligence. The results were as
subjective as they could be in the framework of the evidentiary rules
of the time.
Cases such as Bache v. Proctor represented a leap forward in the
development of a rational mode of interpretation. Compare the case
of the abbot, the croft and the commons described above, 3' where the
court understood the parties' intentions but refused to give effect to
them because of the literal meaning of the words used. However,
cases such as Bache v. Proctor from the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries'3 are entirely consistent with the objective test
that has dominated contract interpretation since the late nineteenth
129. Id. §231, at 150 (quoting Bache v. Proctor, 99 Eng. Rep. 247 (K.B. 1780)).
130. See id. (citing Bache, 99 Eng. Rep. at 247).
131. Bache, 9 Eng. Rep. at 247. An argument such as that successfully made in
Bache v. Proctor was made in 1718 Maryland. In Greshamn v. Gassaway, 1 H. & McH.
34 (Md. 1718), plaintiff's counsel argued, "[t]he intent of a condition or covenant is
always to be regarded, as where there was a condition to pay 501 without saying of
what-it shall be intended to be money." He collected, in an unsuccessful argument,
other English cases where the court's interpretation went beyond the literal meaning
of the words used.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 173-179.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
134. One case cited by Teeven, supra note 51, at 182, for a subjective approach in
this period is Bruce v. Pearson, 3 Johns. 534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808). The defendant
ordered goods from the plaintiff on specified credit terms. Plaintiff shipped only part
of the order and stated more stringent credit terms. The goods did not arrive intact
because of weather conditions. It was held that the plaintiff had the risk of loss. See
id. at 536. In today's parlance we would say that the offer had not been accepted;
rather, a counter-offer had been made. The court said there was no agreement, no
"aggregatio mentium." Id at 535. While this Latin phrase means "meeting of the
minds," a subjective concept, the case is perfectly consistent with objective thinking;
the Latin phrase was a learned but unnecessary flourish.
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century. 135 Holmes, one of the principal exponents of the objective
theory described the ascertainment of the intent of the parties as
follows:
[W]hen it is said that the intent of the parties or of a testator is the
lodestar, etc., all that is meant is that in interpreting a particular
sentence you may look at the general scheme, and the habit of
language disclosed by the instrument, and may ascertain the facts
under which the party acted, to qualify what might be the result of
the particular words if they were taken alone. 136
This is exactly what was done by Lord Mansfield in Bache v.
Proctor, and is the kind of quest for intent that Story seems to have
had in mind. Another quotation on which Holmes, Story and Kent
could probably agree, appears in another of Holmes' opinions: "[a]
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used.' 1 37
Chancellor Kent also wrote in subjective terms, stating that the
interpretive quest is for the mutual intention of the parties which "will
control even the literal terms of the contract, if they manifestly
contravene the purpose; and many cases are given in the books, in
which the plain intent has prevailed over the strict letter of the
contract.'
'13
Yet, when one consults the cases decided by Kent in his judicial
capacity, one sees a highly objective approach to the matters before
him. He refused to allow parol evidence to show an intention not to
include a particular bill of exchange in the terms of a general
release. 139 In a case involving a non-negotiable promissory note for
$80, no time for payment appeared in the note. Testimony was
excluded as to the agreed time of payment. In justification for the
exclusion of this testimony, Kent explained:
The time of payment is part of the contract, and if no time is
expressed the law adjudges that the money is payable
immediately.... When the operation of a contract is clearly settled
by general principles of law, it is taken to be the true sense of the
135. See, e.g., Rodolitz v. Neptune Paper Prods., 239 N.E.2d 628, 630 (N.Y. 1968)
While the Appellate Division's conclusion as to the real intent of the parties
may be correct, the rule is well settled that a court may not under the guise
of interpretation, make a new contract for the parties or change the words of
a written contract so as to make it express the real intention of the parties if
to do so would contradict the clearly expressed language of the contract ....
136. Smith v. Abington Sav. Bank, 50 N.E. 545,546 (Mass. 1898).
137. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
138. James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 554-55 (12th ed. 1873) (1826)
(citing, among others, Bache v. Proctor, 99 Eng. Rep. 247 (K.B. 1780)).
139. See Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
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contracting parties, and it is against established rule to vary the
operation of the writing by parol proof. 140
So much for the subjective intention of the parties, or even the
objective intentions manifested to each other. In another case,41
Thompson wrote the opinion of the court, but in oral argument, Kent
showed his total agreement with Thompson. A ship was advertised to
be copper-fastened and this representation was repeated, according to
a witness, at the time of delivery of the bill of sale. In an action for
breach of warranty, the advertisement was not allowed into evidence
and the testimony of the witness excluded. Thompson wrote, "[i]t
cannot be a safe or salutary rule to allow a contract to rest partly in
writing, and partly in parol. 1 42
Kent also took a highly objective approach to the Statute of Frauds.
In one case he pointed out that many sale of goods cases have
interpreted the Statute to be satisfied by delivery in the legal sense
despite the statutory language that "the buyer must accept part of the
goods sold, and actually receive the same.14 3 He takes issue with some
of these cases, saying, "[tihe circumstances which are to be
tantamount to an actual delivery, should be very strong and
unequivocal, so as to take away all doubt as to the intent and
understanding of the parties."'"
In his approach to interpretation, Kent also subordinated the
parties' intentions to the weight of stare decisis.'45 Nonetheless, in
some of Kent's decisions, his objective test shifted from the notion of
the intrinsic meaning of words to the ascertainment of the parties'
intent from their overall manifestations. In one notable case, Kent
stated, "[t]he intent, when apparent and not repugnant to any rule of
law, will control technical terms, for the intent, and not the words, is
the essence of every agreement.""' But in that case Kent did not go
beyond the language of the written agreement and the taking of
judicial notice of conveyancing practices before the ouster of the
British.
140. Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 189,192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
141. Mumford v. Mc'Pherson, 1 Johns. 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
142- Id. at 418; accord, Smith v. Williams, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 426 (1810) (extolling the
superiority of written proof).
143. Bailey v. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399,420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
144. Id. at 421.
145. The following passage from Frost v. Raymond, 2 Cai. R. 188, 195 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1804), illustrates stare decisis as an interpretive tool:
We are not able to assign a very solid reason for this distinction between the
force and effect of the words "give" [which import a warranty] and "grant"
[which does not import a warranty]. It arose from artificial reasons derived
from the feudal law. The distinction is now become merely technical, but it
is sufficient that it clearly exists, and we are certainly not at liberty to
confound the words, or change their established operation.
146. Jackson v. Myers, 3 Johns. 388,395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
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A similar analysis can be made of the opinions of Chief Justice
Marshall. In one case, he stated that "[c]ontracts are always to be
construed with a view to the real intention of the parties.' 1 47 In the
same term, however, he wrote the opinion in a case where a plaintiff
had addressed a written offer to guaranty the credit of another to
John and Joseph Naylor & Co."4 There was no such firm, but the
letter was received by the firm of John and Jeremiah Naylor & Co.,
for which it was in fact intended. The recipient accepted the offer by
advancing the requested credit. In refusing to allow evidence of the
actual intent of the offeror, Marshall referred to the "wise policy" that
"will not permit a written contract to be explained by parol
testimony.'
' 49
Insurance cases occupied much space in the reports of the early
American republic. Considering their standardized nature, it is not
surprising that stare decisis played a large role in interpreting their
terms, and thus a highly objective viewpoint resulted. Indeed, the
approach to insurance contracts was much like the approach to
statutes. 150 Other standardized contracts received similar treatment. 5'
One historian asserts that Parsons, writing in 1855, "was the first
American treatise writer to argue that an objective standard was
needed in a market-oriented society in order to provide consistent,
147. United States v. Gurney, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 333, 343 (1808). This real
intention was found solely from the written contract.
148. See Grant v. Naylor, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 224, 235 (1808). Marshall's opinion
was principally directed at preserving the integrity of the Statute of Frauds rather
than the parol evidence rule. Not all such cases reached a similar conclusion. A court
of equity might have reformed the document. In the early days, Pennsylvania had no
separate courts of equity and equitable powers were bestowed on courts of general
jurisdiction. Thus, in Lynn v. Risberg, 2 Dall. 180 (Pa. 1792), parol evidence was
admissible to supply a blank name upon whom the party should draw, and in Fox's
Lessee v. Palmer, 2 Dall. 214 (Pa. 1793), a subscribing witness was permitted to testify
to contradict a date in a deed. The latter decision might have been made by a court of
law in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Oneale v. Lodge, 3 H. & McH. 433 (Md. 1796)
(parol evidence admissible to contradict recital in a deed that consideration had been
paid).
149. Grant, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 235.
150. See, e.g., Rhinelander v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 29 (1807) (propriety
of abandonment); Lee v. Boardman, 3 Mass. 238 (1807) (right to abandon); Schmidt
v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. 249 (N.Y. 1806) (same); Williams v. Smith, 2 Cai. R. 1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (describing what constitutes a blockade; effect of pestilential
epidemic in Cadiz); Leavenworth v. Delafield, 1 Cai. R. 573 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804)
(delineating the rights of crew for wages during detention of ship); Patrick v. Ludlow,
3 Johns. Cas. 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802) (meaning of "at or from"); Morgan v. Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 4 Dall. 455, 457 (Pa. 1806) ("No adjudged case in point has been cited on
either side."); Hood's Ex'rs v. Nesbit, 2 Dall. 137 (Pa. 1792) (what constitutes
deviation or barratry); De Peau v. Russel, 2 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 441 (1804) (right to
abandon). For rare cases in which the policy is actually quoted, see Suydam v. Marine
Ins. Co., 1 Johns. 181 (N.Y. 1806); De Peau, 2 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) at 441.
151. See generally Putnam v. Wood, 3 Mass. 481 (1807) (contract of affreightment);
Avery v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass. 160 (1807) (contract employing a
minister).
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uniform principles in interpreting contracts so that men of business
knew the effect of words used in contracts.""i Parsons, who makes no
mention of "men of business" in this context, does strongly support
the application of inherent meaning of words. Indeed, Parsons was a
reactionary, not an innovator. In this respect, he falls back to the
medieval tradition rather than to a more modern notion of objective
intention as reasonably understood by one or both contracting parties.
The flavor of his entire discussion is perhaps accessible in this
quotation:
The first point is, to ascertain what the parties themselves meant and
understood. But however important this inquiry may be, it is often
insufficient to decide the whole question. The rule of law is not that
the court will always construe a contract to mean that which the
parties to it meant; but rather that the court will give to the contract
the construction which will bring it as near to the actual meaning of
the parties as the words they saw fit to employ, when properly
construed, and the rules of law, will permit. In other words, courts
cannot adopt a construction of any legal instrument which shall do
violence to the rules of language, or to the rules of law.M
Parsons' formulation was not much different from that of
Zephaniah Swift, who wrote in 1795, as follows:
The intent of the parties, is to be gathered from the external signs
and actions. For no man may put a construction upon his words
contrary to the common understanding. Therefore he who has an
obligation in his favour, has a right to compel him, from whom it is
due, to perform it in that sense, which corresponds to the ordinary
interpretation of the signs made use of. 1 4
152. Teeven, supra note 51, at 183 (citing 2 T. Parsons, Law of Contracts, at 3-9
(1855)).
153. Parsons, supra note 152, at 6. A similar "plain meaning" approach was taken
by a contemporaneous writer, who, however, avoided coming to grips with the
problem of the interpretive vantage point. John William Smith, The Law of Contracts
24-41 (photo. reprint 1992) (1853). A revealing comment on the plain meaning versus
real intention approach was made in Belmont v. Coman, 22 N.Y. 438 (1860). "It is
one of the matters of fact, found at the trial, that the parties thus understood each
other. This is no reason for a misinterpretation of the written language they used; but
I am glad to believe, that they did not disappoint their own intentions." Id. at 441. An
interesting instance where the proven common intentions of the parties were
subordinated to the inherent meaning of language was Spencer v. Miiisack, 2 N.W.
606 (Iowa 1879). "The court found as a fact that it is generally understood among
merchants that wholesale price means the price paid by the buyer to the wholesale
merchant, without carriage." Id at 608. When the parties came together to calculate
the amount owed they added five percent for carriage. "The question now is whether
this understanding [about the additional charge for carriage] shall prevail over the
real meaning of the contract, as imparted by its terms, and as generally understood by
merchants." Id "In a suit upon the contract its real and not its supposed meaning
must prevail." Id at 609. Thus, the parties' actual agreement was disregarded. This
reasoning also ignores Iowa's enactment of Paley's rule. See infra text accompanying
note 242.
154. 1 Swift, supra note 106, at 377. He would allow exceptions for "the most
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IV. INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS COMMUNICATIONS IN THE
EIGHTEENTH AND EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURIES
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, juries had broad
discretion in interpreting oral expressions. Written expressions were
for the judge to interpret, unless ambiguity appeared, opening the
door to parol evidence. In such a case, the jury had broad discretion
in interpreting the meaning of the expressions of the parties. The little
guidance the courts seem to have given juries leaned toward
objectivity. Gradually, led by the writings of a moral philosopher, the
courts adopted an approach to interpretation that looked to the
reasonable understandings of the parties.
A. Unilateral Communications
Because a contract is often made by a process of offer and
acceptance, it is frequently necessary to interpret the alleged offer
apart from the words of acceptance. Similarly, it is sometimes
necessary to examine the alleged acceptance to determine whether the
words amount to an acceptance. In addition to offers and
acceptances, contracts frequently involve other communications such
as invitations for offers made prior to contracting and notices after
contracting. What test was employed to interpret unilateral
communications? We do not have much information on this for the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Juries were more or less
free to devise their own methods for making these determinations
when the words were susceptible to more than one interpretation. As
one observer notes, "[t]he trial judge could comment on the facts, ask
a jury to explain a verdict, argue with the jury, admonish a jury that
erred, and order a jury to re-deliberate."'55 Another states that "there
was very little law of contract at all before the last [nineteenth]
century, because there was no machinery for producing it and most of
the questions were left to juries as questions of fact.'1 56  Other
decisive reason." Id.
155. Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the
American Common Law, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 407,418 (1999).
156. J. H. Baker, Book Review, 43 Mod. L. Rev. 467, 469 (1980). Consider this
charge to the jury given by a judge who was not a lawyer:
You have heard, gentlemen of the jury, what has been said in this case by the
lawyers-the rascals! But, no, I will not abuse them. It is their business to
make a good case for their clients. They are paid for it, and they have done
in this case well enough. But you and I, gentlemen, have something else to
consider. They talk of law. Why, gentlemen, it is not law that we want, but
justice. They would govern us by the common law of England. Trust me,
gentlemen, common-sense is a much safer guide for us-the common-sense
of Raymond, Epping, Exeter, and the other towns which have sent us here
to try this case between two of our neighbors. A clear head and an honest
heart are worth more than all the law of the lawyers. There was one good
thing said at the bar. It was from Shakespeare, an English player, I believe.
No matter; it is good enough almost to be in the Bible. It is this: "Be just,
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historians agree on the primacy of the jury prior to the nineteenth
century in deciding contract issuesY5
For example, in a 1793 Pennsylvania case," the issue was whether
the defendant had warranted to the seller that the buyer would pay, or
as the defendant's attorney put it, expressed "merely his opinion and
belief that [the buyer] was, as he really is, an honest man."1 59 The
court charged the jury that the words:
may bear either sense, and you must judge how they were
understood by the parties. If this be only a representation, and if it
be fair and honest as to his belief and without concealment of truth
or interest, he is not liable. If this be a warranty, he is liable,
however honest, full and disinterested it may be.'
60
The court provided no guidance on the process of interpretation of
the words or their legal effect.
On the other hand, in a 1795 Pennsylvania case1 61 the court gave
guidance along the lines of an objective test, closer to the medieval
idea of objectivity than to the modern. In this case, Armstrong was
disgusted with the performance of his valuable horse and told
McGhee that he would sell the horse to him for £5. McGhee agreed
and took the horse home. Afterwards, Armstrong told McGhee that
the offer had been made in jest. When McGhee refused to return the
and fear not." That, gentlemen, is law enough in this case, and law enough in
any case. "Be just, and fear not." It is our business to do justice between the
parties. Not by any quirk of the law out of Coke or Blackstone, books that I
never read and never will, but by common-sense and common honesty, as
between man and man. That is our business, and the curse of God is upon us
if we neglect, or evade, or turn from it. And now, Mr. Sheriff, take out the
jury; and you, Mr. Foreman, do not keep us waiting with idle talk, of which
there has been too much already, about matters which have nothing to do
with the case. Give us an honest verdict, of which, as plain common-sense
men, you need not be ashamed.
This charge, given in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, appears in the
argument of defense counsel in King v. Hopkins, 57 N.H. 334, 337 (1876). He gives,
as his source, a biography of William Plumer, a governor of New Hampshire. See id.
at 336.
157. See Simpson, Honvitz Thesis, supra note 5, at 600; James Oldham,
Reinterpretation of 18th Century English Contract Theory: The View from Lord
Mansfield's Trial Notes, 76 Geo. L. J. 1949, 1959-60 (1988).
158. See Barker v. Sutherland, 1 Add. 123 (Pa. 1793).
159. Ld. at 123-24. It is unclear from the report whether the alleged warranty was a
guaranty of payment or a warranty that the buyer was owed a sum of money by the
War Office. Because of the court's reference to the lack of a Statute of Frauds in
Pennsylvania, it was seem that the alleged warranty was a guaranty of payment.
160. Id. at 124. Similarly, the issue in one case was whether an oral agreement to
trade horses for steers and a note was a sale or an executory contract. The jury was
charged to find "according to the true intention of the parties." Kimball v.
Cunningham, 4 Mass. 502,503 (1808).
161. See Armstrong v. McGhee, 1 Add. 261 (Pa. 1795).
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horse, Armstrong brought an action in replevin. 162 The judge gave the
jury the following charge:
Did both parties understand it as a binding contract? Though
Armstrong did not, and though McGee knew that he did not, if he
gave no signs to Armstrong that he did not understand it as a
binding contract, why did Armstrong trust him? And if he trusted
him, why should he come here now to save himself from the
consequences of such gross folly? .... This contract, as far assigns
and all the formal parts of a contract can go, is complete .... If
McGhee gave Armstrong ground to believe that he considered this
contract-which, to all appearance, is a complete one-as a mere
sham or jest, conveying no right, he must take it as he then gave
signs that he understood it, and remain a mere trustee to Armstrong,
and bound to deliver up the horse when required.1 63
If we attempt to formulate a rule of law based on this case, it would
read something like this: if the parties exchange words of offer and
acceptance, and one party clearly evinces a joking state of mind, a
contract is nevertheless formed unless the other party also gives
external signs of sharing the joking state of mind. A statement of the
modern objective test as applied to this case would, instead, be that if
one party is clearly joking and the other party is or should be aware of
the joking state of mind, no contract is formed."6
B. Dr. Paley's Rule of Interpretation for Unilateral and Bilateral
Expressions
Archdeacon William Paley of the Church of England has had a
significant impact on the rules of interpretation. He posited, in 1785,
an objective test that was adopted by Kent for his Commentaries, as
well as by others.165 It has been applied many times in this country to
oral and written exchanges, 166 even into the twentieth century.167 The
test applies what the First Restatement called a standard of
"reasonable understanding."1" The vantage point is the promisor's
162. See id.
163. Id. at 262.
164. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22, § 2.3.
165. "The true principle of sound ethics is, to give the contract the sense in which
the person making the promise believed the other party to have accepted it, if he in
fact did so understand and accept it." 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law
557 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 12th ed. 1989) (1873). The
rule was urged (without citation) in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Hazard's Adm'r v. New England Marine Ins. Co., 33 U.S. 557, 567 (1834). The
insured in New York by letter to Boston underwriters described his ship as
"coppered." Some evidence indicated this had a different meaning in Boston than in
New York.
166. The rule is supported by Wigmore. 9 Wigmore, supra note 50, § 2466.
167. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Scheer, 120 A. 679, 680 (N.J. 1923); United States
Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 128 N.E. 123, 124 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.).
168. Restatement of Contracts § 227 (1932).
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reasonable understanding of how the promise was understood by the
promisee. Paley stated "[w]here the terms of promise admit of more
senses than one, the promise is to be performed 'in that sense in which
the promisor apprehended, at the time that the promisee received
it.""' 69 He gives the example of Tamerlane's promise to the besieged
garrison at Sebastia. Tamerlane told the garrison that "if they would
surrender, no blood should be shed.' 7  They surrendered and
Tamerlane had them buried alive. Paley explains that Tamerlane
"fulfilled the promise in one sense, and in the sense too in which he
intended it at the time; but not the sense in which the garrison of
Sebastia actually received it, nor in the sense in which [Tamerlane]
himself knew that the garrison received it."'' It was in this last sense
that Tamerlane in conscience was bound to perform."T
Paley's test is partly subjective. Insofar as it focuses on the
promisor's understanding, it takes into account the state of mind of
the particular promisor. Nonetheless, at the time Paley formulated
this rule, and for more than half a century thereafter, parties were
forbidden to testify; the promisor's state of mind could be proved only
by objective evidence. Inasmuch as parties can testify today,
Wigmore, who expressed approval of Paley's test, further objectifies
Paley's law by adding the idea of the "reasonable" understanding of
the promisor. This makes the test almost indistinguishable from the
objective test put forward by Williston, which chooses the reasonable
understanding of the addressee of the communication.'"3 Despite the
subjective element in Paley's test, there is much truth in the assertion
that the "direct ancestry [of the objective] theory goes back to
Paley... a theological utilitarian, a contemporary of Adam Smith."'74
But it is probably more accurate to state that Paley's objective test of
the intention of the parties supplanted, but only in part, the earlier
169. William Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, in The Works of William
Paley, D.D. 27, 48 (J. J. Woodward 1841). Although the core of the rule appears in
the original in quotations, it is uncertain what source, if any, Paley was quoting. Much
the same line of thinking had been expressed by David Hume, A Treatise of Human
Nature 523-26 (Selby Bigge ed., 1888) (1739-40). Paley seems also to have been
influenced by Hutcheson. See 4 Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral
Philosphy, (1747) in Collected Works of Frances Hutcheson 177-202, (Georg Olms
Verlag 1990). Paley's thinking may have been derivative, but Paley's writings were
known to every educated English-speaking person in the first half of the nineteenth
century. Paley's "work was enormously popular;, fifteen editions appeared in Paley's
lifetime (d. 1805)." Simpson, Honvitz Thesis, supra note 5, at 590 n.348.




173. 1 Williston, supra note 55, § 21, at 23.
174. Edwin W. Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 Colum. L
Rev. 859, 878 n.56 (1928); see Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761 n.2
(2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring).
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objective approach which looked to the inherent meaning of words,
rather than the intention of the parties objectively manifested.
There were a number of applications of Paley's rule prior to the
removal of the bar of party testimony. An insurance case decided in
1843 involved the interpretation of a cryptic letter.175 A fire insurance
policy contained a condition that if any additional insurance were
obtained, the insured should use reasonable diligence to notify the
insurer; if the additional insurance was not "acknowledged and
approved" by the insurer in writing, the policy would cease. The
insured notified the insurer in writing that additional insurance had
been obtained and received a succinct reply signed by the secretary of
the insurance company stating, "[w]e have received your notice of
additional insurance.' 76 When the insured property was consumed by
fire, the company denied coverage, claiming it had not approved the
additional insurance. The court, said, "[1]et us apply Dr. Paley's rule
in relation to the performance of contracts." Applying the rule, the
court said, "[t]hey must have intended that the plaintiff should
understand from the answer that every thing had been done which
was necessary to the continuance of the policy, and consequently that
they approved, as well as acknowledged the further insurance. '177
The first reported case that I have found of the application of Dr.
Paley's rule where party testimony was given was in 1861.178 The
parties were negotiating for the sale of land. The vendor stated to the
vendee that he would execute a deed of the same kind under which he
took title, calling it a "warranty deed." In fact it was a deed that
contained only a warranty against grantor's acts. The vendee
understood the vendor's term "warranty deed" to mean a deed with a
general warranty, and the vendor knew that the vendee had that
understanding. The vendee rejected a tender of a deed containing
only a warranty against grantor's acts and brought suit. The court,
applying Paley's vantage point of the promisor's understanding of the
promisee's state of mind, held for the vendeeJ 79
175. See Potter v. Ontario & Livingston Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Hill 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1843).
176. Id. at 149.
177. Id. This approach was followed in Hoffman v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 32 N.Y.
405, 413 (1865) ("It is a rule of law, as well as of ethics, that where the language of a
promisor may be understood in more sense than one, it is to be interpreted in the
sense in which [the promisor] had reason to suppose it was understood by the
promisee."). See also Gunnison v. Bancroft, 11 Vt. 490,493 (1839). The first reported
application in England seems to have been Mowatt v. Lord Londesborough, 118 Eng.
Rep. 1156, 1167 (K.B. 1854).
178. See Barlow v. Scott, 24 N.Y. 40 (1861). Although Paley is not cited, Paley's
test was employed. See also White v. Hoyt, 73 N.Y. 505, 515 (1878) (applying the same
test by employing the testimony of one of the defendants against the defendants).
179. Barlow. 24 N.Y. at 42-44.
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C. Flaws in Paley's Objective Test
In formulating his rule of interpretation, Archdeacon Paley ignored
the understanding of the promisee except as it was perceived by the
promisor. Paley was mostly concerned with nailing the crafty
promisor who formulated a promise in terms that he knew the
promisee would misunderstand."s  John Austin pointed out that
Paley's formulation was flawed in two ways. First, if the promisee
understood the promisor's real meaning, but the promisor was
unaware of the promisee's understanding, the promisee could reap a
benefit that the promisee did not expect. Second, if the "promisor
underrates the expectation of the promisee he disappoints an
expectation." '181
Paley's view has generally been superseded by objective approaches
that pay greater attention to the vantage point of the promisee. Most
of these approaches were born after the rule rejecting party testimony
had been overturned by statute. An earlier view favoring the promisee
in some contexts was to the effect that "whether given words were
used in an enlarged or a restricted sense.., that construction should
be adopted which is most beneficial to the promisee.""
Dr. Paley's major contribution to the interpretive process was to
provide a philosophical foundation for the shift from pinpointing the
inherent meaning of words to a search for the understanding of a
party to the contract.
V. PARTIES AS WITNESSES
From the late 1500s parties were not allowed to be witnesses in
their own cases."8 Somewhat later, interested non-parties were also
180. Paley, however, ends his discussion of the interpretive process with a mention
of the "infirmity" of promisors caused by "confusion, or hesitation, or obscurity"
causing them to "encourage expectations" that "they never dreamed of." Paley, supra
note 169, at 49.
181. John Austin, 1 Lectures on Jurisprudence Lecture XXI 442 n.90 (5th ed.
1885). Adam Smith in his lectures at Glasgow University had also stressed the
expectations of the promisee as the basis of contract. See generally Smith, supra note
28. A student's notes of these lectures was not published until the twentieth century.
Thus, it is doubtful whether his thinking on the subject had any effect on the common
law.
182. Hoffnan, 32 N.Y. at 413 (citing to authorities as far back as the seventeenth
century).
183. See 2 Wigmore, supra note 50, § 575. The rules were more complicated in
courts of equity. The defendant's answer was deemed evidence that had to be
rebutted by two witnesses or one witness and circumstantial evidence. But the
defendant's statements in an affirmative defense are not evidence. 2 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America
§§ 1528-1530 (11th ed. 1873); Denton v. M'Kenzie, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 289 (1792);
Thornton v. Gordon, 41 Va. 719 (1844). To some extent parties' interrogatories could
be considered by the equity court. See Greenleaf, supra note 21, § 329. If the plaintiff
deposed the defendant, the defendant's denial was conclusive. See Pollard v. Lyman, 1
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excluded from the witness stand.184 (Ironically, however, in actions of
debt and detinue, defendants were entitled to trial by wager of law;
their sworn denial of liability supported by sworn compurgators was
decisive.) s18  As explained to Indiana school children three centuries
later, the rule barring a party from testifying "is founded on the
motive his interest is supposed to inspire, to state what is false or to
pervert or suppress the truth. ' 18 6 At the end of the nineteenth century,
Jeremy Bentham wrote his ferocious attacks on the English legal
system in general, and the disqualification of parties and interested
third persons in particular. As one historian of the law has observed:
In some respects his "Judicial Evidence"... is the most important of
all his censorial writings on English law. In this work he exposed the
absurdity and perniciousness of many of the established technical
rules of evidence. "In certain cases," he says, "jurisprudence may be
defined, the art of being methodically ignorant of what everybody
knows." 187
Among Bentham's specific targets were the rules dealing with the
incompetence of parties and others who had a pecuniary interest in
the lawsuit. Wigmore, among others, grants Bentham a major share
of the credit for the reforms of evidence in the mid-nineteenth
century."8 In England, a series of acts from 1843 to 1851 lifted the
disqualification as witnesses of parties and interested third persons.189
Similar reforms were generated in the United States; first in
Michigan" and Connecticut, 9' then in the Field Code of Civil
Procedure enacted in New York and soon elsewhere.' 92
Day 156 (Conn. 1803).
184. See 2 Wigmore, supra note 50, § 575.
185. See Teeven supra note 51, at 9-10.
186. Thomas L. Smith, Elements of the Laws 257 (1860) (recommended by the
State Board of Education for use in the public schools of Indiana on Dec. 24, 1852).
As in the case of most common law rules, exceptions and qualifications existed. See
Nelson, supra note 100, at 156-57.
187. Dillon, Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America 339-42, reprinted in
Roscoe Pound & Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Readings on the History and System of
the Common Law 241 (3d ed. 1993).
188. See Wigmore, supra note 50, § 575. Others include Dillon, supra note 187, at
241; Robert Wyness Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical
Perspective 30 (1952) ("Bentham expressing that dissatisfaction" with the ways of
civil judicature "with unmistakable emphasis and laying down those postulates which
are in time to furnish material for reconstruction" of the law of evidence and civil
procedure). See also id. at 43.
189. These legislative acts are summarized in Millar, supra note 188, at 207. A
more detailed summary appears in 2 Wigmore, supra note 50, at 488.
190. See 2 Wigmore, supra note 50, at 693 n.9, (citing Michigan Rev. St. 1846, ch.
102 § 99).
191. See Millar, supra note 188, at 207 (citing Act of 27 June, 1848: Public Acts of
Connecticut ch. 80, at 71).
192. See The Code of Civil Procedure of the State of New York § 1708 (1998
reprint) (1850) ("All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in the
next two sections, who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and perceiving can make
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At first, if intention was in issue and a party could testify, it seemed
to the courts only natural that, as the New Hampshire court put it,
"[b]eing himself a competent witness, he could, of course, testify to his
intentions."1" The New York court stated, "where the character of
the transaction depends upon the intent of the party, it is competent,
when that party is a witness to inquire of him what his intention
was."" 4 The United States Supreme Court agreed,'9 stating that "[i]f
the declarations of a man when doing an act may be proved in his own
behalf to show the purpose and intent with which it was done... it
must be competent for a party to the transaction, cognizant of all the
circumstances, and a witness of the act, to state its purpose, being
subject, of course, to cross-examination." ' Clearly, in a criminal case
where evidence of subjective intention may make the difference
between a conviction for murder and acquittal, the defendant is
permitted to testify as to the intention with which he committed an act
that resulted in someone's death."9
known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Therefore neither parties, nor
other persons who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding, are
excluded; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor person on account of their
opinions on matters of religious belief...."). Section 1709 provided for the
disqualification of persons of unsound mind and some children under the age of ten.
Section 1710 is not really an exception; rather it recognized certain privileges such as
the attorney-client privilege.
On David Dudley Field and the Codification movement, see Daun van Ee, David
Dudley Field and the Reconstruction of the Law (1986), a dissertation submitted in
1974. For a formidable bibliography on the subject see Roscoe Pound, David Dudley
Field- An Appraisal, in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays 3 (Alison Reppy ed.,
1949); Alison Reppy, The Field Codification, in id. at 17.
193. Graves v. Graves, 45 N.H. 323, 324 (1864); see also Downes v. The Union
Congregational Soc. in Francestown, 63 N. H. 151, 152 (1884) ("[w]hen the intention
of the parties to a transaction is material, they may testify to it directly."); Delano v.
Goodwin, 48 N.H. 203, 205-06 (1868) ("where the intention or good faith of a party to
a suit becomes material... the party himself, if a competent witness, may testify
directly to his intention or understanding."); Hale v. Taylor, 45 N.H. 405, 407 (1864)
(holding that while intention not manifested by words or deeds is irrelevant,
testimony to explain the intent of one's words or deeds is admissible). Compare the
preceding with twentieth century New Hampshire cases. !-g., Riley v. Springfield Say.
Bank, 168 A. 721 (N.H. 1933) (holding evidence of subjective intent admissible where
contract is ambiguous; there is no valid contract if there was a misunderstanding); A.
Perley Fitch Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 133 A. 340 (N.H. 1926) (using an objective test to
interpret oral contracts).
194. Thurston v. Cornell, 38 N.Y. 281, 287 (1868) (examining party's intent to
either receive usurious compensation for a loan or to receive reimbursement of
expense of collection); see also Bedell v. Chase, 34 N.Y. 386 (1866) (stating that
inventory purchasers could testify as to their intent not to defraud seller's purchasers);
McKown v. Hunter, 30 N.Y. 625 (1864) (holding that a defendant can testify as to his
intention in a malicious prosecution action); Forbes v. Waller, 25 N.Y. 430 (1862)
(holding that an assignor may be asked whether his intention was to defraud
creditors); Seymour v. Wilson, 14 N.Y. 567 (1856) (same).
195. See Bank v. Kennedy, 84 U.S. 19 (1872).
196. Id at 26.
197. See 2 Wigmore, supra note 50, § 581. One observer wrote about "the good old
times" when "everybody as witnesses except those who knew something about the
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It took some time for courts to place some limits on party testimony
and to adjust their substantive-law focus to protect the trial judge and
jury from the dangers of perjury. The key case was Smith v. Hughes
decided in 1871 in the Queen's Bench.19 The issue was whether the
defendant was justified in rejecting a tender of "new oats" when he
expected a delivery of "old oats." The trial judge gave the jury a
charge based on Paley's rule.199 In reversing, Blackburn stated:
If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself
that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the
terms proposed by the other party and that other party upon that
belief enters into the contract with him, the man thus conducting
himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the
other party's terms. 200
Here, the vantage point of the reasonable person in the position of
the promisee becomes the legally relevant perspective. The parties'
own intentions on the meaning of the contract had become irrelevant.
This vantage point was quickly adopted in New York for the
reasonable woman.20 1 There were, however, foreshadowings in earlier
cases.21 In Massachusetts, before Holmes had entered law school, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in ruling on the trial court's
charge to the jury concerning an attorney's words as an agent for his
client spoken to a deputy sheriff had taken this perspective. The
attorney spoke to the deputy after which the deputy turned over to a
third person-a receiptor-some property that he possessed under a
subject matter." A. B., Testimony of the Parties in Criminal Prosecutions, 14 Am. L.
Reg. & U. of Pa. L. Rev. 129, 130 (1866).
198. 6 L.R.-Q.B. 597 (1871).
199. See id. at 599.
200. Id. at 607.
201. Philip v. Gallant, 62 N.Y. 256 (1875) (apparently the reasonable French
woman should understand English).
202. A favorite of old casebooks was White v. Corlies, 46 N.Y. 467 (1871), which
held that an uncommunicated intent to accept an offer does not create a contract.
Under the subjective theory, as applied in France, it could be argued that a contract
would have been formed because the offeree took concrete steps (purchasing and
working on lumber), thus providing objective evidence of the subjective intention to
accept. The court, on the cusp of subjective and objective thinking, thought that the
concrete steps were not clearly referable to the claimed contract. See id. at 470.
Silent acquiescence in plaintiffs offered terms could be presumed under certain
circumstances. See Alexander v. Vane, 150 Eng. Rep. 537 (Ex. D. 1836); accord, Hall
v. Inhabitants of Holden, 116 Mass. 172 (1874). Holmes cited Hall for the proposition
that "[a]ssent, in the sense of the law, is a matter of overt acts, not of inward
unanimity in motives, design, or in the interpretation of words." O'Donnell v. Town
of Clinton, 14 N.E. 747,751 (Mass. 1888). The United States Supreme Court used this
language: "the belief of one party to a transaction is not the criterion by which the
rights of the parties are to be governed, unless the other party, by his conduct or
declarations, induced that belief." Bank v. Kennedy, 84 U.S. 19, 28 (1872). This case,
however, allowed testimony by a party of his intent. See id. This is one of the
transitional cases from a subjective to an objective approach.
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writ of attachment.'0 3 The issue was whether the attorney had
authorized the transfer of possession. The trial court charged the jury
that the deputy would not be liable for wrongfully transferring the
property if the attorney's communication to the deputy was "made
with the intent on the part of the attorney of influencing or controlling
the officer's conduct, and of assuming the risk upon the plaintiff.""z
On appeal, this charge was held to be erroneous.
The true inquiry for the jury was to determine what was in fact said
by the plaintiff's attorney, and whether what was thus said was of such
a nature as to indicate those purposes to influence or control the
officer's conduct, and to authorize the officer to act upon such
assumption. "The secret intent of the attorney, if not in accordance
with the language used by him, would not affect the right of the officer
to act upon the instructions actually given."'
In Illinois, the trial judge properly refused an instruction concerning
the understandings of the parties. The Illinois Supreme Court in this
1867 case affirmed, stating, "[t]he proper object of inquiry on the part
of the jury was, not so much the manner in which the purchaser of the
hogs may have understood the contract in his own mind, but rather
what was the language used in making the purchase ... ." 206
Perhaps an objective test in the post party-testimony era had
already been established in New York by Dillon v. Anderson.2° A
written proposed contract had been drawn up to be signed by three
parties. The defendant signed and delivered the writing to the
plaintiff. The third party never signed or assented in any way. The
court said:
[t]he defendant being a witness in his own behalf, was asked by his
counsel: "Did you intend to make an individual contract?" which
question was overruled by the court. It called for his purpose
mentally formed, but undisclosed, to the plaintiff. It sought to annul,
by an intention not expressed, words and acts relied upon by the
plaintiff, by which he was influenced, and which of themselves were
prima facie evidence of an agreement. An agreement is said to be
the meeting of minds of the parties. But minds cannot meet when
203. A "receiptor" is defined as "[a] person who receives from a sheriff another's
property seized in garnishment and agrees to return the property upon demand or
execution." Black's Law Dictionary 1275 (7th ed. 1999).
204. Wright v. Willis, 84 Mass. 191, 193 (1861); see also Daley v. Carney, 117 Mass.
288 (1875) (basing decision on evidence which justified the inference of a particular
intent on the part of defendant). Holmes entered law school in 1864. Liva Baker,
The Justice from Beacon Hill 163-77 (1991) (detailing Holmes' 12 years of legal
education).
205. Wright, 84 Mass. at 193.
206. Nichols v. Mercer, 44 M. 250,252 (1867).
207. 43 N.Y. 231 (1870). In a similar case, the court said that a party may not be
asked by his counsel whether he intended to be bound by signing a written guaranty,
but the question was proper on cross-examination. See Quimby v. Morrill, 47 Me. 470
(1859).
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one keeps to itself what it means to do, nor can one party know that
the other does not assent to a contract, the terms of which have been
discussed and settled between them, unless dissent is made known.
Here was the oral bargaining going before the written contract.
Here was the written contract signed and delivered without
qualification of the act of delivery, without the expression of the
intention called for by the question that the act of delivery was not
to be taken as meaning all it seemed to mean. The testimony called
for was not proper. °3
The decision was perhaps based on the parol evidence rule, but that
rule should not have barred evidence to clarify an ambiguity in the
written evidence' or to show the lack of finality of the instrument.210
The 1870's was the transitional decade. This is illustrated by the
well-known case of Dickinson v. Dodds, which introduced the
doctrine of "indirect revocation. '21 Dodds made an offer in writing
to sell certain realty to Dickinson. The terms of the offer indicated an
intent that the offer be irrevocable until 9:00 A.M. Friday. Prior to
that time, Dickinson became aware that Dodds had sold the parcel to
a third party. Dickinson then communicated his acceptance. In
holding that the offer had been revoked prior to Dickinson's
attempted acceptance, the speeches of Lord Justice James, and
especially Lord Justice Mellish, show a confused combination of
subjective and objective thinking. James stated that there never was
"that existence of the same mind between the two parties which is
essential in point of law to the making of an agreement." 22 He allows
that the offeror may be required to let the offeree know of the change
of mind, although the offeree's acquisition of that information is
enough. Mellish made several points. He stated that the intervening
sale to a third party is enough to constitute a revocation, a conclusion
perfectly in accord with the subjective theory-the sale was objective
evidence of the vendor's subjective intent. Moreover, he asserted,
parting with the property has the same effect as the offeror's death,
another truism under a subjective approach. Nonetheless, he further
buttressed his subjective arguments with the fact of the offeree's
knowledge of the sale, but this objective fact is not central to his
reasoning.
This case in Chancery comes several years after the Queen's Bench
had ushered in the modem objective test in Smith v. Hughes.13
Clearly, while the Queen's bench was ushering out subjective
thinking, some subjective elements were holding out in Chancery, but
208. Dillon, 43 N.Y. at 236.
209. See Greenleaf, supra note 21, § 297, at 340-41.
210. Id. § 284, at 322-23.
211. 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876).
212. Id. at 473.
213. See Dillon, 43 N.Y. at 236.
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even there the objective approach would soon take hold. As I said
before, the history of the objective theory is not seamless.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE TEXT WRITERS
Perhaps the first text expression of the modem objective approach
was by that extraordinary lawyer, Judah Benjamin." 4 In his work on
Sales, Benjamin wrote:
It must be borne in mind that the general rule of law is, that
whatever a man's real intention may be, if he manifests an intention
to another party, so as to induce the latter to act upon it in making a
contract, he will be estopped from denying that the intention
manifested was his real intention.215
The idea of "manifest" intention took hold, and early in the
twentieth century became gospel. The modem objective theory had
taken hold, not as just a rule of estoppel, a doctrine that requires a
factual finding of injurious conduct in reliance, but as a hard and fast
rule. Another Benjamin, Reuben M. Benjamin, wrote, as clearly and
emphatically as anyone has, the classical late-nineteenth century view
of objective intention:
Agreement is a matter of outward expressions; i.e., words and
conduct. A mere mental assent to an offer does not constitute an
acceptance.... Since the concurrence or union of wills can be
ascertained only by means of words and conduct, the law imputes to
each of the parties a state of mind or intention corresponding to the
reasonable meaning of his words and conduct, whatever may have
been the actual state of mind of the party. In construing an
agreement "the question is, what by a fair and reasonable
construction of the words and acts of the parties, was the bargain
between them, and not what was the secret intent or understanding
of either of them.
216
214. "He was elected to the United States Senate in 1852, and refused the offer of a
seat on the Supreme Court. He became Attorney General, Secretary of War, and
then Secretary of State for the Confederate Government. Biographies by P. Butler
(1907) and R.D. Meade (1943), and E. Evans (1988)." A. W. Brian Simpson, Leading
Cases in the Common Law 240 n.45 (Clarenden Press Oxford 1995) [hereinafter
Simpson, Leading Cases]. After the Civil War, Benjamin emigrated to England and
became England's "leading appellate barrister." Id. at 240.
215. J. P. Benjamin, A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property 357-58
(London 1868), as quoted by Simpson, Leading Cases, supra note 214, at 159. Note,
however, that language in case law justified Benjamin's statement. For example, in
dictum, Baron Bramwell had said:
intention is immaterial till it manifests itself in an act. If a man intends to
buy, and says so to the intended seller, and he intends to sell, and says so to
the intended buyer, there is a contract of sale; and so there would be if
neither had that intention.
Browne v. Hare, 157 Eng. Rep. 561,565-66 (Ex. 1858).
216. Reuben M. Benjamin, The General Principles of the American Law of
Contract 7-8 (2d ed. 1907). This Benjamin is described on the title page as "Professor
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Before Reuben Benjamin's efforts, Langdell had published his
Summary of the Law of Contracts.217 Langdell parroted the subjective
thinking of earlier times, but adopted an objective approach by
employing legal fictions. He started his discussion of mutual consent
with this wonderfully quirky explanation:21 "Mutual consent is of the
essence of every contract ... and therefore it must always exist, in
legal contemplation, at the moment when the contract is made. '219 On
the same page, he stated "mutual consent alone is of no avail in
making a contract.""0 He ended the discussion on the next page with
"[a]t the moment of making the contract, therefore, mutual consent in
fact is not necessary, but only in legal intendment."'' Langdell's
contemporaries, such as Sir Frederick Pollock,' and Edward Avery
Harriman2 dispensed with the fiction and adopted the perspective of
the reasonable promisee's understanding.
VII. LASTING CONQUESTS OF SUBJECTIVITY: INSANITY,
INTOXICATION, DEATH
One strain of subjectivity did surface early in the United States.
The contracts of insane 4 and intoxicated parties were held to be
voidable. The law of England has never gone this far into
subjectivity.226
The flirtation with the subjective theory has left one long-lasting
rule affecting contract formation. The general rule in the United
States is that the death of the offeror terminates an offer. 7 This was
an import from the French subjectivists. An admiralty case decided in
of Law in Bloomington Law School." In the same year, a new edition of Bishop on
Contracts was published. It contained subjective language similar to that quoted
supra, at note 73. Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Contracts 126
(2d enlarged ed. T. H. Flood and Co. 1907).
217. C.C. Langdell, A Summary of the Law of Contracts (2d ed. 1880).
218. Williston's capsule description of Langdell makes Langdell seem weird or, at
least, quirky. See Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography 199-201 (1940).
219. Langdell, supra note 217, § 148, at 193 (emphasis supplied).
220. Id.
221. Id. § 149, at 194 (emphasis supplied).
222. See Frederick Pollock, Principles of Contract *30 (1876) ("not intention in the
abstract, but communicated intention, is what we have to look to in all questions of
the formation of contracts"); see also id. at *4.
223. See Edward Avery Harriman, Elements of the Law of Contracts 34 (1896).
224. See Lazell v. Pinnick, 1 Tyl. 247 (Vt. 1801).
225. See Wigglesworth v. Steers, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 70 (Va. 1806). But see, 1
Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 358 (photo.
reprint 1972) (1795) (stating that drunkenness is "a crime, and is of the party's own
procuring," thus not grounds for avoiding a contract unless he was debauched by the
other party).
226. See G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract 44, 513-14 (9th ed. 1995).
227. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 48 (1979); Restatement of Contracts
§ 48 (1932); Joseph M. Perillo, 1 Corbin on Contracts § 2.34 (revised ed. 1993)
(stating and criticizing the rule).
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1847, The Palo Alto.'2 was one of the first common-law cases to adopt
this notion. 9 It stated that the death of the offeror would have acted
to revoke the offer. The court canvassed the common-law cases
concerning the requirement that a revocation be communicated and
also made reference to works in French by Pothier, Touiller, and
Merlin. The court then stated "there is one well-established
exception" to the rule that a revocation must be communicated. This
exception was that "[i]f the party who makes the offer dies or
becomes insane before it is received and accepted, the offer is then a
nullity, though accepted before the death is known." Pothier had
expressly stated that the death of the offeror terminates the power of
acceptance even if the death is unknown to the offeree. 23 1 English
cases have taken the position that the death of the offeror terminates
the power of acceptance only if the offeree is notified of the death;
mere knowledge is not sufficient.33
Neither the Palo Alto court nor, I think, any other common-law
court has adopted the rest of Pothier's analysis in the same section as
that cited by the court. Pothier asserted that the mere dispatch of a
letter of revocation (objective evidence of subjective intention) will
revoke an offer subject to the offeror's liability to indemnify an
offeree who takes concrete steps in reliance on the offer.,-' Although
judicial decisions in common law jurisdictions have not followed
Pothier on this point,235 the Civil Code adopted in California and some
other Western states provides that a revocation is effective on
dispatch. 6 The California Civil Code was substantially based on the
proposed Civil Code of the State of New York drafted by a
commission headed by David Dudley Field and first published in
1865.231 This document was heavily influenced by subjective
228. 18 F. Cas. 1062 (D. Me. 1847).
229. A predecessor was Mactier's Adm'rs v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830).
230. Palo Alto, 18 F. Cas. at 1067.
231. See R. J. Pothier, A Treatise on the Contract of Sale No. 32 (Legal Classics
Library 1988) (photo. reprint 1839) (1762). Other American cases have reached the
same result by analogy to the common law of agency pursuant to which the death of
the principal terminates the agent's authority even if the agent is unaware of the
death. See Michigan State Bank v. Estate of Leavenworth, 28 Vt. 209 (1856) (death
of promisor of a letter of credit), overruled on other grounds by Austin v. Curtis &
Walker, 31 Vt. 64 (1858). Michigan State Bank, which employed the analogy to
agency, has been cited for the broader ground that death terminates the power of
acceptance created by an offer. See Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F.2d 138, 141 (4th Cir.
1936).
232. See Westhead v. Sproson, 158 Eng. Rep. 301 (Ex. 1861); Treitel, supra note
226, at 43.
233. See Harriss v. Fawcett, 8 L.R.-Ch. 866,869 (Ch. App. 1873).
234. See Pothier, supra note 15, at 32.
235. See PeriUo, supra note 227, § 2.19.
236. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1586-1588 (West 1982).
237. See N.Y. Civil Code (reprint 1998) (1865). Revocation is dealt with in § 771-
772. Section 772 states that the manner of transmission is governed by §§ 766 and
768. Section 768 adopts the mailbox rule of Adams v. Lindsell. For a brief history of
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thinking.38 The subjectively inspired Field Code had its objective side
also. It enacted, as A rule of interpretation, a version of Paley's rule.
Section 814 of the Code provides: "[i]f the terms of a promise are in
any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the
sense in which the promiser [sic] believed, at the time of making it,
that the promisee understood it." 9
In this form, with some slight changes in grammar and spelling, it is
law in California,2  Georgia,241 Iowa,242 Montana,243 North Dakota2"
and Oklahoma.245 Under these statutes, a party to the contract can
testify as to his or her intention with respect to ambiguous terms.246
Ironically, Field's Civil Code's earlier companion piece, the Code of
Civil Procedure, was adopted in New York and widely accepted
elsewhere in the United States. The Code of Civil Procedure
introduced the competency of parties to testify in their own behalf, a
reform that led to the resurgence of the objective theory of contract
formation and interpretation.247
VIII. ANOTHER ENDURING CONQUEST: DURESS, UNDUE
INFLUENCE, MISREPRESENTATION, MISTAKE
This article does not claim to analyze the relative potency of the
objective and subjective theories as applied in the law courts today.
Suffice it to say, that they vary from the intensely objective approach
of the New York Court of Appeals2' to the subjective "knowing and
the adoption of the California Civil Code, see Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Contract
Distinguished from Quasi Contract, 2 Cal. L. Rev. 171,171 n.1 (1914).
238. One commentator noticed the subjective elements in the California Code and
appeared perplexed by their presence and pronounced its provisions with respect to
contract formation as "radically defective both in form and content" and replete with
"unexplained departures from established principles." Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Mutual
Assent in Contract Under the Civil Code of California, 2 Cal. L. Rev. 345, 366 (1914).
239. N.Y. Civil Code § 814.
240. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1649 (West 1985).
241. See Ga. Code Ann. § 13-2-4 (Michie 1982) ("The intention of the parties may
differ among themselves. In such case, the meaning placed on the contract by one
party and known to be thus understood by the other party at the time shall be held as
the true meaning.").
242. See Iowa Code Ann. § 622.22 (West 1999) ("When the terms of an agreement
have been intended in a different sense by the parties to it, that sense is to prevail
against either party in which a party had reason to suppose the other understood it.").
243. See Mont. Code Ann. § 28-3-306 (1999).
244. See N.D. Cent. Code § 9-07-14 (1987).
245. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 165 (West 1993).
246. See Kytlica v. Albertson & Co., 190 N.W. 159 (Iowa 1922); Brannen v. State
Exch. Bank of Parkersburg, 180 N.W. 886 (Iowa 1921); Musselshell Valley Farming &
Livestock Co. v. Cooley, 283 P. 213 (Mont. 1929); Peterson v. Ramsey County, 563
N.W.2d 103 (N.D. 1997).
247. See supra note 192 for a discussion of The Code of Civil Procedure's impact on
party testimony.
248. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1993)
(stating that evidence of practical construction not admissible if the contract is
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voluntary" test imposed by the federal courts for the surrender of
federal rights enacted for the protection of employees against various
forms of discrimination.24 9 Some other formulations fall in between.
For example, in Oregon, where apparently no relevant statute exists, a
party can testify to his or her belief that a contract has been made but
not with respect to intention related to ambiguous terms.2-3
The subjective test has, however, been victorious in some of the
grounds for avoidance of a contract. Since the earliest days of equity,
deeds, contracts, and other instruments have been set aside on
grounds of duress, fraud, and mistake. It has been said that no
specific doctrines appeared to have existed for these decisions, other
than ideas of fairness or reasonableness." l To the contrary, I think
there is strong evidence that the courts had a conceptual
understanding of what they were doing. The important point is that
none of these doctrines engage the intent of the promisor but instead
focus on the outside circumstances that induced the promise.
In a recent article, Professor Ricks has identified the rationale of
the early cases giving relief for mistake. The courts employed the
doctrine of failure of consideration,' which stated that because of
mistake, one party did not or would not get an important part of the
bargain, the bargained for consideration failed. Ricks did not place
his own spin on what the courts of that era did, but discovered what
they in fact said.
A rationale for duress can be deduced from Blackstone's discussion.
He stated that relief from an agreement on grounds of duress was a
possibility only if the agreement was coerced by actual (not
threatened) imprisonment or fear of loss of life or limb. "A fear of
battery * * * is no duress; neither is the fear of having one's house
burned, or one's goods taken away or destroyed;" Blackstone wrote,
"because in these cases, should the threat be performed, a man may
have satisfaction by recovering equivalent damages: but no suitable
atonement can be made for the loss of life, or limb." ' 3" Blackstone
unambiguous); W.W.W. Associates, Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 1990)
(holding that parol evidence inadmissible to show that a term with a plain meaning is
ambiguous).
249. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974); Long v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529, 1534 (3d Cir. 1997); Gorman v. Earmark Inc.,
968 F. Supp. 58, 62 (D. Conn. 1997) (addressing pension claims under ERISA, age
and disability discrimination statutes and comparable state law).
250. See Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505 (Or. 1977).
251. See Gordley, supra note 13, § 68.
252. See Val D. Ricks, American Mutual Mistake: Half-Civilian Mongrel,
Consideration Reincarnate, 58 La. L. Rev. 663, 688-704 (1998). I have subscribed to
the notion that the term "failure of consideration" should be abandoned. See
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22, § 11.21. Nonetheless, we are here discussing
doctrine prior to the twentieth century which employed this concept. Today, scholars
generally subscribe to Corbin's terminology, "failure of constructive condition."
253. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *127 (William
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seems to have understood relief for duress to be based on a party's
interest in bodily integrity and freedom from physical restraint.'
Blackstone was not strictly correct, for the doctrine of duress of goods
had already been originated when he wrote.25 A more modern
doctrine was aborning.z6 Several decades later, a Virginia judge was
able to give a different doctrinal explanation to support relief for
duress-in a word, oppression. 7 He equated the coercing party with
guardians who took advantage of their wards, lawyers who abused
their clients and similar oppressors. Parsons, whose general approach
seems to have been a throwback to sixteenth century thinking, here
adopted the theory of the lack of consent, straddling with it also the
censure of wrong-doing. 8
Relief for fraudulent misrepresentation was based on moral
notions. One 1806 case from Virginia helps prove this point.2 9 Judge
Tucker wrote of "moral guilt,"2" and the "folly, or depravity'2 61 of the
conspiring creditor. Judge Roan, concurring, spoke of his
"turpitude," 262 "iniquity, 263 and "iniquitous gains."" The key point
for this paper is that the basis was not some defect in the consent of
the promisor, but some moral fault in the promisee who extracted the
promise. Parsons, for one, agreed that the basis of relief for fraud was
its immorality, but pointed to the impossibility of making all deception
actionable. Human law, he opined, cannot adopt God's entire moral
code or we would forever be punishing each other; thus "a certain
amount of selfish cunning passes unrecognized by the law." 65 Parsons
further preached that it is a principle of the common law that fraud be
S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1992) (1766).
254. W.W. Story shared a similar belief. See his eloquent passage in Story, supra
note 75, § 92.
255. The doctrine of duress of goods originated with the case of Astley v. Reynolds,
2 Strange 915, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B. 1732) where a pledgee refused to surrender
pledged property to the pledgor except on payment of an unjustified bonus. The
pledgor made the payment and recovered the excess payment, the court stating the
owner "might have such an immediate want of his goods, that an action of trover
would not do his business." Id.
256. See, e.g., Jones v. Barkley, 2 Doug. 684, 696-98, 99 Eng. Rep. 434, 441-44
(1781) (discussing the unreported case of Smith v. Bromley).
257. See Austin's Adm'x v. Winston's Ex'x, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 33, 44 (1806).
258. Parsons deals with duress under "Persons of Insufficient Mind to Contract,"
along with non compos mentis, spendthrifts and seamen. This category is sandwiched
between infants and married women on one side, and aliens, slaves, and outlaws on
the other. 1 Parsons, supra note 152, at 319-21. Williston, who edited the eighth
edition of Parsons' treatise, speaks disparagingly of the work. Williston, supra note
218, at 136-37.
259. See Austin's Adm'x, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 33.
260. Id. at 35.
261. Id. at 39.
262. Id. at 43 (Roan, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 45, 49.
264. Id. at 48.
265. Parsons, supra note 152, at 769.
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undefined, because "[t]he very definition would give the crafty just
what they wanted."'' 6
As James Gordley has written, "Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas
concluded that a person acts voluntarily even if he must choose among
evils, as when a captain has to jettison cargo in a storm.""6 7 Thus,
under this view, when parents pay a kidnapper to save their
daughter's life they may be expressing "the most genuine, heartfelt
consent." Holmes agreed with the Aristotelian view of duress which
states that "conduct under duress involves a choice. '"Z2 "It always is
for the interest of a party under duress," he wrote, "to choose the
lesser of two evils."270 Lord Coke looked to the external causes for a
different reason, that is, "so in pleading must hee shew some just
cause of feare, for feare of it selfe is internall and secret."7' Coke
thus expressed a preference for objective facts and an a priori
rejection of proof of subjective states of mind. He laid down a
substantive rule of law with evidentiary concerns in mind.
Will theorists of eighteenth and nineteenth century France found a
different basis for relief. They argued that duress, fraud, and mistake
vitiated the will, and contaminated the appearance of consent. The
theory held that such apparent consent was not voluntary. Pothier,
for one, stated that there was no consent if the parties were mistaken
about the substance of a sale or its price, or if they misunderstood
each other as to the substance of the deal.rn In illustrating such a
misunderstanding, he put forth the case of a party who intends to sell
a house for 9,000 livres while the other understands that the
agreement is for a nine year lease at that price.-m  American
misunderstanding cases agreed ith this principle?214
266. Id.
267. Gordley, supra note 13, at 30.
268. John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 1, 20 N.C. L Rev. 237, 238 (1942);
see also Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 Colum. L Rev.
603 (1943) (discussing the notion that one's choices under compulsion are still
"voluntary"); F.C. Sharp, The Ethics of Bread of Contract, 45 Int'l J. of Ethics 27, 30-
31 (1934).
269. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Mo., 248 U.S. 67,70 (1918).
270. Id.
271. 2 Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England *253b
(19th ed. 1832) (1628).
272. Pothier, supra note 15, at 20-22.
273. See id at 20. Common law text writers usually distinguish misunderstanding
(Pothier's example) from mistake, but common law courts do not generally make the
distinction. See, eg., Hughes v. Mercantile Mut. Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 265 (1873) (the two
ships "Empress"). Usually cited to illustrate misunderstanding is Raffles v.
Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864) (the two ships -Peerless"),
but Simpson has shown us how little we can understand about the case as the court
dismissed the complaint without opinion. Simpson, Leading Cases, supra note 214, at
135-62 (1995). For a discussion of misunderstanding, see George E. Palmer, The
Effect of Misunderstanding on Contract Formation and Reformation Under the
Restatement of Contracts Second, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 33 (1966).
274. See Coles v. Bowne, 10 Paige Ch. 526 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
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Because the parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of duress,
fraud, mistake or any other ground for showing that a contract can be
set aside or reformed, the adoption of a subjective theory of contract
formation had more than a rhetorical impact on grounds for
avoidance. In the United States, the doctrinal explanations for relief
on these grounds shifted from the outside forces that induced the
promise, to the interior of the mind of the promisor.
Modern doctrine has shifted again and has returned to the
Aristotelian conception that duress and other grounds for avoidance
of contracts involve abuses of the bargaining process. 75 But in the
nineteenth century, the French-grounded notion of lack of true
consent became the accepted explanation for avoidance or
reformation of contracts and has found adherents even into the
twentieth century. Clark's 1894 horbook covered these matters in a
chapter entitled "Reality of Consent." '276 The last edition of this
hombook, published in 1931, contained the same chapter heading.2 7
Reuben Benjamin, an early proponent of the modern objective theory
of formation and interpretation,2 8 nonetheless in 1907 dealt with the
avoidance of contracts under "Reality of Consent. ' 279  Clarence
Ashley in 1911 wrote in terms of "no meeting of the minds. 280
Williston, however, in 1920 blasted the notion that reality of consent
has anything to do with grounds for avoidance. He restricted the
notion of the unreality of consent to cases of fraud in the factum and
the like, e.g., a shotgun-induced signing of an unread document or
where the promisor signs a document that has been switched by
sleight of hand."s Corbin in 1960 treated mistake as free standing and
did not deal with other grounds of avoidance;"s Corbin's treatment of
mistake cannot be described as either subjective or objective.
Do the doctrinal differences between current text writers and the
law-book authors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
275. See Calamari & Perillo supra note 22, ch. 9 ("Avoidance or Reformation for
Misconduct or Mistake"); Farnsworth, supra note 55, at 241 ("Abuse of the
Bargaining Process," except that mistake is dealt with in Chapter nine under "Failure
of a Basic Assumption"); Murray supra note 55, at § 92 ("Abuse of the Bargaining
Process," except for mistake which is dealt with in section 91 under "Operative
Expressions of Assent.").
276. See Clark, supra note 43, ch. 7 (1894). Clark, a professional writer of law
books, is best known today for his contract with West which contained a condition
that he not imbibe alcoholic beverages and for the consequences of noncompliance
with that condition. Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1 (N.Y. 1908).
277. See Wm. L. Clark, Jr., Handbook of the Law of Contracts ch. 7 (Archibald H.
Throckmorton & Alvin C. Brightman eds., 4th ed. 1931).
278. See supra text accompanying note 216.
279. See Benjamin, supra note 216, ch. 5. [Reference is to Reuben B., not Judah B.]
280. Clarence D. Ashley, The Law of Contracts § 46 (1911).
281. See 1 Williston, supra note 55, § 20; 3 Williston, supra note 55, §§ 1486-1627
(1920).
282. See 3 Holmes, supra note 45, ch. 27. This volume deals with interpretation, the
parol evidence rule, and mistake.
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make a difference in the actual decision of the cases? Perhaps not,
because, as current text writers agree, although the objective theory
dominates the formation and interpretation of contracts, the tests for
avoidance are largely subjective. Take the case of duress. My own
hornbook states:'
as in the case of all contractual rules that make reference to mental
processes, we must ask whether the test is objective or subjective.
This last is the easiest of the questions posed. In contrast to earlier
cases, the overwhelming weight of modern authority uses a
subjective test. Thus the issue now is whether the will of the
particular person has been overcome,2 and not, as the earlier cases
had held, whether a brave person would be put in fear or whether
the will of a person of ordinary firmness would be overcome.&
Murray discusses the treatment of the Restatement (Second) and
sees it as applying a subjective test to "easily frightened" persons, but
an objective test as to other persons.' Farnsworth's treatment is
quite similar to Murray's.2 Thus, subjectivity survives, because a
person who is indeed frightened by something less than gunfire,
arguably fits into the category of an "easily frightened" person.
Let me illustrate the subjectivity of the avoidance cases with well-
known cases. Take the casebook example of Gallon v. Lloyd-Thomas
Co.,m where the court held that duress caused the plaintiff to agree to
a modified employment contract:
Plaintiff stated that he was very upset; that he and Goran found
Gatenbey in the room and the latter began reading from a paper "*
* * and telling me that I was a bad man, a bigamist, promiscuous or
maybe worse and went on for nearly an hour and a half or two until
I was completely broken down. 2n
The subjective state of mind-"completely broken down"-was the
key element in the finding of duress.
283. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22, at 309.
284. See Kaplan v. Kaplan, 182 N.E.2d 706, 709 (I1l. 1962); Silsbee v. Webber, 50
N.E. 555 (Mass. 1898) (a classic exposition by Holmes); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein,
120 A.2d 11 (NJ. 1956); 13 Samuel Williston. The Law of Contracts § 1605 (3d ed.
1957). But see Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885 (3d Cir.
1975) (applying a standard of duress whereby threats of actual bodily harm are
required).
285. See Young v. Hoagland, 298 P. 996 (Cal. 1931). At times the "mind of a
person of ordinary firmness" rule is routinely stated, but usually in a case where the
precise test is not really at issue. See, eg., Bata v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 224 A.2d
174 (Pa. 1966), where the old rule is stated but in a context where "we find it
inconceivable that appellant was subject to any degree of restraint or danger." Id. at
180. The test is, however, repeated in Strickland v. University of Scranton, 700 A.2d
979 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
286. See Murray, supra note 55, § 93(I).
287. See Farnsworth, supra note 55, § 4.18.
288. 264 F.2d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 1959).
289. Id. at 824.
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Consider another casebook case, this time illustrating undue
influence. In Methodist Mission Home of Texas v. N-A.-B--,2 9 an
unwed mother was persuaded to release her newborn child for
adoption. Note the subjectivity of the court's description of the
circumstances leading to the release.
Plaintiff's testimony concerning her emotional distress during the
critical period following the birth of her child is rendered credible by
the fact that an unwed mother who has just given birth is usually
emotionally distraught and peculiarly vulnerable to efforts, well-
meaning or unscrupulous, to persuade her to give up her child.
Immediately following plaintiff's announcement that, contrary to the
expectations of Mrs. Burns, she intended to keep her son, she was
subjected to an intensive campaign, extending over a five-day
period, designed to convince her to give up her baby, rather than to
insure that her decision, whatever it might be, would be based on a
consideration of all relevant factors.2 91
A subjective test for avoidance was adopted by Samuel Williston, a
scholar who is famous or infamous-depending on one's point of
view-for propagating the objective approach to contract formation
and interpretation. It is difficult to find a more subjective approach to
grounds for avoidance than Williston's in the following passage that
deals with duress and misrepresentation.
The tendency of the modern cases, and undoubtedly the correct rule
is that any unlawful threats which do in fact overcome the will of the
person threatened, and induce him to do an act which he would not
otherwise have done, and which he was not bound to do, constitute
duress. The age, sex, capacity, relation of the parties and all the
attendant circumstances must be considered. This follows the
analogy of the modern doctrine of fraud which tends to disregard
the question whether misrepresentations were such as would have
deceived a reasonable person, and confines the question to whether
the misrepresentations were intended to deceive and did so. 2
92
Williston wrote this passage in 1920. Has the situation changed?
Allan Farnsworth suggests that it has, the pendulum having swung
away from a subjective standard of free will to a standard of whether a
reasonable alternative exists 9.2 1 Granted, this is the standard that
courts employ when business organizations assert that defense of
duress. After all, how can we define or probe the "free will" of the
Loral Corporation?294
290. 451 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
291. Id. at 543-44. Other well-known undue influence cases clearly employing a
subjective test include Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1021 (1980), and Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533
(1966).
292. 3 Williston, supra note 55, § 1605 at 2832-33 (footnotes omitted).
293. See Farnsworth supra note 55, § 4.18 at 270.
294. See Loral Corp. v. United States, 434 F.2d 1328 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Austin
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But where an individual raises the defense, the courts seem to focus
on the subjective mental state of the individual as well as the existence
of a reasonable alternative. Thus, in one recent case, an employee
alleged that she was terminated for protesting criminal accounting
practices by her employer. 95 She sought to disavow a general release
of claims against her employer, alleging duress stemming from three
threats. The threats were (1) to withhold her last two weeks salary
and severance pay, (2) to withhold a letter of recommendation, and
(3) an implicit threat to her safety. While the first threat was certainly
not a sufficient basis for a plea of duress because court action was a
reasonable alternative, the second was a sufficiently wrongful threat
"depend[ing] greatly upon the subjective state of mind of the
plaintiff."296  Court action could not supply her with a letter of
recommendation! Of course, the third threat might suffice even under
Blackstone's criteria, although the threat was only implicit.
History is not seamless, and neither is current law. In another
recent case, governed by New Jersey law, the court found that
questions of fact needed to be resolved on the issue of duress. It
quoted one guiding precedent to the effect that "the 'decisive factor' is
the wrongfulness of the pressure exerted."'  This quotation is
squarely in accord with the objective theory of duress. On the next
page, the court quotes another precedent to the effect that since
duress is based on "the unreality of the apparent consent, the
controlling factor is the condition, at the time, of the mind of the
person... rather than the means by which the given state of mind was
induced, and thus the test is essentially subjective." 21 Consistency
was not the hobgoblin of the judge who wrote or signed onto this
opinion. Doctrinal writers, including myself, suffer from the same
inconsistency. This New Jersey case represents the state of the law of
duress affecting individuals. Wrongful coercive conduct or a wrongful
threat of coercion must have subjectively induced the assent of the
victim.
2 9
I have focused on duress and undue influence, but similar subjective
factors are at work in cases claiming relief for misrepresentation.
Misrepresentation cases generally do not discuss the reliance factor.
The focus of most of the cases is on the nature of the deception and
Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971).
295. See King v. Donkenny, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 737 (W.D. Va. 2000).
296. Id. at 739.
297. Farris v. County of Camden, 61 F. Supp. 2d 307, 336 (D. NJ. 1999) (quoting
Continental Bank v. Barclay Riding Acad., Inc., 93 NJ. 153, 177 (1983)).
298. 61 F. Supp. 2d at 337 (quoting McBride v. Atlantic City, 146 NJ. Super. 498,
503 (Law Div. 1974)).
299. Wrongful conduct need not be criminal or tortious. The abusive exercise of a
legal right can be the predicate for duress. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 22 § 9.3;
Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 Pac. L J. 37, 60-69
(1995).
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the justification for any reliance."° The Restatement (Second) states
a rule concerning reliance that is totally subjective. Section 167
provides that "[a] misrepresentation induces a party's manifestation of
assent if it substantially contributes to his decision to manifest
assent."30 1 The caselaw rarely looks directly into the "internal and
secret" recesses of the claimant's mind, as he or she can testify to what
induced the consent to the contract, release, or other instrument. The
testimony is rebuttable, if at all, by circumstantial evidence of lack of
reliance. Thus, if the claimant conducted its own investigation of the
facts, the court may conclude that there was no reliance."° Similarly,
circumstantial evidence can be marshaled to corroborate the fact of
reliance.303
Cases involving allegations of mistake are similar. No one seems to
discuss the state of mind of the party seeking to invoke the doctrine of
mistake. If the risk of a mutual mistake has not been assumed, and
the mistake is about a basic assumption of the parties, relief is
warranted if the "mistake has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances."3" The assumption is that if these three
factors coexist, the mistake is an inducing cause of the claimant's
assent to the contract. Mistake is, however, defined as "a belief that is
not in accord with the facts." Beliefs are subjective. The predicate for
applying the three-prong test for relief is a subjective belief. Relief
cannot be said to be based entirely on a subjective or objective basis
because the subjective beliefs must have an objectively material effect
on the agreed exchange.
The explanation for the greater concentration on the claimant's
mental state in cases of duress, undue influence, and
misrepresentation than in cases of mistake is that the former are based
on the wrongful conduct of the promisee that overwhelmed or
corrupted the mental processes of the promisor. On the other hand,
mutual mistake is a no-fault doctrine. More objective criteria are in
order; no one has toyed with the mind of the promisor.
IX. THE ROLE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.
Holmes left law school in 1866, and entered the practice of law,
while simultaneously writing for the American Law Review. There is
300. See, e.g., Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 480, 502 (D. Del. 1999)
(methodically going through the elements for relief for misrepresentation, though
ignoring reliance, proceeding to ask the question "[w]as Parra's reliance on
Fernandez's misrepresentation justifiable?").
301. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 167 (1981).
302. See McCormick & Co. v. Childers, 468 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1972); Gary v.
Politte, 878 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Copland v. Nathaniel, 624 N.Y.S.2d 514
(Sup. Ct. 1995). But see Fisher v. Mr. Harold's Hair Lab Inc., 527 P.2d 1026, 1034
(Kan. 1974); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 167 ill. 1 (1981).
303. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 859 (1997).
304. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152, cmt. a.
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no hint of an objective theory of contracts in these early writings. In
1871 he was comfortable talking about the meeting of the minds.? In
1870, he began teaching constitutional law at Harvard. Repelled by
the newly appointed Dean Langdell's case method of instruction, he
left Harvard 6 and spent three years producing a new edition of
Kent's Commentaries. A biographer has stated that Holmes totally
eliminated and rewrote the notes to the text that had been added by
earlier editors.-
In this 1873 publication, in a brief note on duress, Holmes employs
the rhetoric of subjective intent ("his will is not free").1  Holmes'
note on insanity fails to notice that the English cases are based on
objectivity and the American cases on subjectivity. He connects the
English with the American with a "but," as if the cases were
distinguishable, rather than based on differing doctrinal premises.9
In his annotations to Kent's discussion of fraud and nondisclosure,
Holmes wrote about the cases in which the fraud is of such a sort that
"the minds of the parties never meet," a phrase repeated twice in the
same paragraph.1
In the segment on interpretation of contracts,3 none of the key
cases of the 1860s or early 1870s are cited. Indeed, they are all absent
from the table of cases, save Smith v. Hughes, which is cited on a point
of misrepresentation law, rather than for the principle for which it
principally has been cited, that is, the ushering in of the modem
objective theory.312 By the way, these cases from the 1860s and 1870s
with the exception of Bank v. Kennedy,313 were about individuals, not
corporations. For example, Smith was a farmer, and Hughes was a
trainer of horses.
It is only in his 1880 lectures at the Lowell Institute that were
published the following year as The Common Law that we see a
citation to Smith v. Hughes in the context of interpretation, 31' and
Holmes' assertion of a full-blown objective theory of contracts. The
courts had preceded him. Moreover, given the antiquarian bent of the
305. See, e.g., American Law Review 6:3550 (1871), reprinted in 1 The Collected
Works of Justice Holmes 271-73 (Sheldon M. Novick ed. 1995) (reporting
Massachusetts District Court Bankruptcy decisions).
306. Baker, supra note 204, at 208-09.
307. See id. at 209-12.
308. See 2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law, supra note 138, at 452 n.1(c).
309. Id. at 451 n.1(a).
310. Id. at 482 n.1.
311. See id. at 553-57.
312. The true usher appears to have been Judah Benjamin. See supra text
accompanying notes 214-15. Benjamin's text on sales was cited to the court on
another point. Smith v. Hughes, 6 L.R.-Q.B. 597, 599 (1871). Thus, all the lawyers
and judges in the case were familiar with this text.
313. 84 U.S. 19 (1872). This was a suit by a receiver of one bank against another
bank.
314. See Holmes, Jr., supra note 82, at 310 n.1.
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lectures, his statement of the objective theory may have been inspired
largely by the objective approach to contract law preceding the
legitimization of party testimony rather than the new cases that
deemed testimony of intent to be irrelevant.
In The Common Law, Holmes lent a clear and dogmatic voice to
provide scholarly validation to what the courts had started. Courts
had not yet made such sweeping generalizations as his statement that
"the making of a contract does not depend on the state of the parties'
minds, it depends on their overt acts. ' 315 He reiterates the point as
follows "[t]he law has nothing to do with the actual state of the
parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and
judge parties by their conduct. '316 He continued preaching his highly
objective outlook. In 1897, he wrote, "the making of a contract
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on
the agreement of two sets of external signs -not on the parties having
meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing. 3 17
Holmes' statement of the objective theory became one of the
canons of contract law of most of the twentieth century, and in many
quarters remains so.318 There is, however, one aspect of his objective
approach that has had no noticeable impact. Holmes formulated an
objective approach to voidable contracts, concentrating on mistake
and fraud.1 9 This formulation has been critiqued in detail in an article
by Robert Birmingham.3 0 It has had little effect on the courts.
In the formulation of an objective theory of fraud and mistake,
Holmes attempted to lead the courts and failed. In his successful
formulation of objective approaches to formation and interpretation,
he managed to run fast enough to capture the lead in the parade that
was already marching on.
CONCLUSION
Prior discussions of the origins of the objective theory of contract
formation and interpretation, by Friedman, Horwitz, and Gilmore,
focused on the rhetoric of subjectivism that was prevalent in the mid-
nineteenth century cases and texts. These discussions paid little or no
attention to the outcome of cases decided in that period; those
outcomes were almost entirely objectively based. The language of the
315. Id. at 307.
316. Id. at 309.
317. 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,464 (1897).
318. Despite the predominance of the objective approach, a considerable number
of decisions today are subjectively based and parties testify as to their intentions. See,
e.g., Sutton v. Bank of New York, 673 N.Y.S.2d 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (basing a
determination that a bank account was jointly held on parties' submissions).
319. See Holmes, Jr., supra note 82, at 308-39.
320. See Robert L. Birmingham, Holmes on 'Peerless': Raffles v. Wichelhaus and
the Objective Theory of Contract, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 183 (1985).
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cases and texts began shifting in the 1870s and shifted dramatically in
the early 1900s. Friedman, Horwitz and Gilmore saw the shift in
language through the lens of economic determinism and reached the
erroneous conclusion that the shift in language signified a shift in
result to accommodate the transformed economic system. A
thorough examination of the cases and texts in conjunction with an
analysis of the rules of evidence demonstrates that objective
approaches have dominated the common law since "to the time that
the memory of man runneth not to the contrary."nl The reason for
the persistence of objective approaches can be found in the legal
profession's distrust of the testimony of parties. This distrust resulted
in court-imposed rules forbidding party testimony starting in the
sixteenth century. When legislatures overturned these rules in the
nineteenth century, the profession, acting through the courts, made
party testimony of intention irrelevant, giving birth to the modem
objective theory.
321. The phrase is Blackstone's. 1 Blackstone, supra note 253, at *76.
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